[EM] New MN court affidavits by those defending non-Monotonic voting methods & IRV/STV

[Terry Bouricius]

But Dave Ketchum's example is about how IRV can fail to elect a Condorcet 
winner. This candidate gets zero votes under plurality rules and is 
immediately eliminated under two-round runoff rules as well. Plurality and 
Two-round runoffs are the two systems the plaintiffs are seeking to 
preserve, while "constitutionally" prohibiting Condorcet (as well as IRV).

Terry Bouricius

----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Dave Ketchum" <davek at clarityconnect.com>
To: <kathy.dopp at gmail.com>; <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>
Sent: Friday, November 07, 2008 10:09 PM
Subject: Re: [EM] New MN court affidavits by those defending non-Monotonic 
voting methods & IRV/STV


Perhaps this could get some useful muscle by adding such as:
      9 B>A

Now we have 34 voting B>A.  Enough that they can expect to win and may 
have
as strong a preference between these two as might happen anywhere.

C and D represent issues many feel strongly about - and can want to assert
to encourage action by B, the expected winner.  If ONE voter had voted B>A
rather than D>B>A, IRV would have declared B the winner.

Note that Condorcet would have declared B the winner any time the B>A 
count
exceeded the A>B count (unless C or D got many more votes).

DWK

On Fri, 7 Nov 2008 14:05:03 -0700 Kathy Dopp wrote:
> Dave,
>
> I agree with you -that is important too, but the attorneys and
> judge(s) have their own criteria for judging importance as compared to
> existing laws.
>
> Your example IMO does show unequal treatment of voters, so perhaps
> I'll include it as one of many ways to show how IRV unequally treats
> voters and see if the attorneys use it or not.
>
> Thanks.
>
> Kathy
>
> On Fri, Nov 7, 2008 at 1:35 PM, Dave Ketchum <davek at clarityconnect.com> 
> wrote:
>
>>Topic below is monotonicity, which seems discardable as a side issue.
>>
>>Of more importance is IRV's NOT CARING whether more voters indicate
>>preferring A>B or B>A - can even declare A the winner when a majority of
>>voters prefer B of this pair.
>>
>>Example:
>>20 A>B
>>15 C>B>A
>>10 D>B>A
>>
>>Here a majority prefer B>A, but C and D have a special attraction for 
>>some
>>some minorities.
>>
>>DWK
>>
>>On Thu, 6 Nov 2008 11:23:39 -0700 Kathy Dopp wrote:
>>
>>>FYI,
>>>
>>>Defendants in the MN Case (who are promoting IRV and STV methods) have
>>>just released new affidavits to the court that discuss Arrow's theorem
>>>as supporting the case for IRV/STV and dismissing the importance of
>>>IRV's nonmonotonicity.
>>>
>>>I posted three of these most recent affidavits of the defendants of
>>>Instant Runoff Voting and STV here:
>>>
>>>http://electionmathematics.org/em-IRV/DefendantsDocs/
>>>
>>>The first two docs listed are by Fair Vote's new expert witness.
>>>
>>>The third doc is by the Minneapolis, MN City attorney.
>>>
>>>The defendants characterize Arrow's theorem as proving that "there
>>>exists no unequivocally satisfactory, or normatively appealing, voting
>>>rule." and claim the "possibility of nonmonotonic results plagues ALL
>>>potential democratic voting systems with 3 or more candidates unless a
>>>dictatorial voting rule is adopted."
>>>
>>>I would appreciate it if any of you have time to read some of the
>>>above three docs, particularly the third document by the attorney, and
>>>give me your responses.
>>>
>>>FYI, the plaintiff's characterizes Arrow's theorem on p. 3 of this doc:
>>>
>>>
>>>http://electionmathematics.org/em-IRV/DefendantsDocs/11SuplementaryReplyMemoinSupportofMotionforSummaryJudgment.pdf
>>>
>>>Thank you.
>>>
>>>Kathy
-- 
  davek at clarityconnect.com    people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
  Dave Ketchum   108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708   607-687-5026
            Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
                  If you want peace, work for justice.



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