[EM] Methods for Senators, governors, etc.

[Dave Ketchum]

The named methods get to me, so trying:

Ala Schulze, find the innermost unbeaten set.

If all set members are true ties with each other, pick one via truly random
selection.

This will often result in a single winner, and should be doable from the
N*N matrix by most voters (matrix BETTER be available to all interested).

Else we have a cycle and room for debate in completing the rules among
such as wv vs margins.  Simplicity remains desirable.

BTW - since the voters have better opportunity to express their desires
than with such as Plurality, there is no need for such complications as
runoffs.

DWK

On Sun, 2 Nov 2008 09:00:56 -0300 Diego Santos wrote:

 >
 > 2008/11/2 Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km-elmet at broadpark.no
 > <mailto:km-elmet at broadpark.no>>
 >
 >     Dave Ketchum wrote:
 >
 >         A few thoughts:
 >             Plurality or Approval cannot fill need.
 >             IRV uses about the same ballot as Condorcet - but deserves
 >         rejection for its method of counting.
 >             Condorcet can - but I am trying to word this to also accept
 >         other methods that satisfy need.
 >             Range does much the same, but needs better words than I have
 >         seen as to how, simply, to rate SoSo when ranking would be
 >         Good>SoSo>Bad.
 >             Method needs to be understandable by voters (I read
 >         compaints about handling of Condorcet cycles - I claim that they
 >         do not need to be ubderstood in detail - mostly that discussing
 >         frequency and effect should satisfy most).
 >             The methods that inspired this missive claim to offer some,
 >         possible valuable, benefits - at a cost that may be prohibitive
 >         - leave them to audiences who agree the benefits are worth the cost.
 >
 >
 >     If Schulze's too complex, use MAM (Ranked Pairs) or River. These are
 >     at least easy to explain. If people are very concerned about FBC,
 >     then perhaps MDDA - though I don't know it does with respect to the
 >     advanced criteria (like clone resistance).
 >
 >     Schulze does have the advantage of wide use, at least compared to
 >     the two other methods here. While I don't know if potential
 >     legislators would lend any weight to its use in computer related
 >     organizations, the others haven't much of a record at all.
 >
 >     One other thing to note is that some multiwinner elections in New
 >     Zealand uses Meek STV. Not exactly the simplest to understand of
 >     methods, so it may still be possible to get complex methods through.
 >
 > The only criterion people are concerned is to find a majority winner.
 > This is the reason of the wide use of two-round system outside the USA
 > and the adoption of IRV in some local elections in this country.
 > Unfortunately, TRS and IRV winners are apparent majority winners, and
 > the true majority exists only for the Condorcet winner.
 >
 > Condorcet cycles are a problem. I think that sincere cycles would be
 > rare, but manipulation would bring to frequent cycles.
 > Condorcet//Approval is a simple cycle resolution method with stable
 > counterstragies to tactical voting, if explicit approval cutoffs are
 > used, or discourage burying if approval is implicit. There is no need to
 > explain beatpaths, winning votes, or defeat strength.
 >
 > --
 > ________________________________
 > Diego Renato dos Santos

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   Dave Ketchum   108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708   607-687-5026
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