[EM] Methods for Senators, governors, etc.

[Diego Santos]

2008/11/2 Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km-elmet at broadpark.no>

> Dave Ketchum wrote:
>
>> A few thoughts:
>>     Plurality or Approval cannot fill need.
>>     IRV uses about the same ballot as Condorcet - but deserves rejection
>> for its method of counting.
>>     Condorcet can - but I am trying to word this to also accept other
>> methods that satisfy need.
>>     Range does much the same, but needs better words than I have seen as
>> to how, simply, to rate SoSo when ranking would be Good>SoSo>Bad.
>>     Method needs to be understandable by voters (I read compaints about
>> handling of Condorcet cycles - I claim that they do not need to be
>> ubderstood in detail - mostly that discussing frequency and effect should
>> satisfy most).
>>     The methods that inspired this missive claim to offer some, possible
>> valuable, benefits - at a cost that may be prohibitive - leave them to
>> audiences who agree the benefits are worth the cost.
>>
>
> If Schulze's too complex, use MAM (Ranked Pairs) or River. These are at
> least easy to explain. If people are very concerned about FBC, then perhaps
> MDDA - though I don't know it does with respect to the advanced criteria
> (like clone resistance).
>
> Schulze does have the advantage of wide use, at least compared to the two
> other methods here. While I don't know if potential legislators would lend
> any weight to its use in computer related organizations, the others haven't
> much of a record at all.
>
> One other thing to note is that some multiwinner elections in New Zealand
> uses Meek STV. Not exactly the simplest to understand of methods, so it may
> still be possible to get complex methods through.
>
> ----
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>

The only criterion people are concerned is to find a majority winner. This
is the reason of the wide use of two-round system outside the USA and the
adoption of IRV in some local elections in this country. Unfortunately, TRS
and IRV winners are apparent majority winners, and the true majority exists
only for the Condorcet winner.

Condorcet cycles are a problem. I think that sincere cycles would be rare,
but manipulation would bring to frequent cycles. Condorcet//Approval is a
simple cycle resolution method with stable counterstragies to tactical
voting, if explicit approval cutoffs are used, or discourage burying if
approval is implicit. There is no need to explain beatpaths, winning votes,
or defeat strength.

-- 
________________________________
Diego Renato dos Santos
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