[EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative 2

Abd ul-Rahman Lomax abd at lomaxdesign.com
Tue Dec 16 16:41:40 PST 2008

At 01:24 AM 12/16/2008, Kathy Dopp wrote:
> > Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2008 02:58:29 +0000 (GMT)
> > From: Kevin Venzke <stepjak at yahoo.fr>
> > Subject: Re: [EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative 2
> >
> > Hi,
> >
> > --- En date de?: Dim 14.12.08, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax 
> <abd at lomaxdesign.com> a ?crit?:
> >> > >> That's not very generous. I can think of
> >> a couple of defenses. One would
> >> > >> be to point out that it is necessitated by
> >> the other criteria that IRV
> >> > >> satisfies. All things being equal, I consider
> >> LNHarm more desirable than
> >> > >> monotonicity, for instance.
>Abd ul,
>That is about the strangest position I've seen you take on any subject
>because it is equivalent to saying that it is more important for a
>voting method not to hurt my lower choice candidates than my first
>choice candidates.

I didn't write that. Venzke's quotation got all messed up. If you get 
the list mail and keep it, look back at my  post. Venzke wrote that 
thing about monotonicity.

LNH, has, I think, been pretty widely misunderstood. I don't consider 
it desirable *at all*. That is, it interferes with the very desirable 
process of compromise that public elections should simulate. However, 
Bucklin Voting allows a voter-controllable level of LNH compliance 
that I consider good. Pure Approval doesn't allow sufficient 
flexibility of expression. Range only allows preference expression, 
of a favorite over a frontrunner, with some sacrifice of voting 
strength in the real election. That may be a good thing, but 
politically, at this point, concern over this, including Later No 
Harm, inhibits the adoption of Approval, though it really ought to be 
totally obvious that Approval is a huge bang-for-the-buck reform: 
Open Voting, Count All the Votes. Free. And actually one of the 
better methods, considering how simple it is.

Bucklin uses an RCV ballot, but is much, much simpler to count, and 
doesn't suffer from the serious pathologies that afflict IRV. Monotonic.

>I.e. Monotonicity is, briefly stated, "first no harm".
>So you are saying that you don't want a voter's second choice to hurt
>the voter's first choice, but you don't mind if the voter's first
>choice hurts the voter's first choice.
>I find that position to be very bizarre.

So do I. However, in defense of Venzke, he thinks that the situations 
where IRV is non-monotonic are rare enough that it's not worth worrying about.

But nonmonotonicity is a clue that there is something seriously wrong 
with the amalgamation method, it's quirky and unreliable. The real 
bite is with Center Squeeze.

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