[EM] A new simulation

Abd ul-Rahman Lomax abd at lomaxdesign.com
Fri Dec 5 10:49:01 PST 2008

At 05:15 PM 12/4/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
>If you think the risk is too great even so, have a preface 
>adjustment where all candidates that fall below a threshold of first 
>votes are eliminated. The threshold should be very low, say 10. This 
>will introduce some compromising incentive, but again, that 
>incentive should be very slight.

Sure. However, if we are going to discuss pie-in-the-sky 
alternatives, why not start with one that is spectacular in what it 
could accomplish, that finesses the whole issue. Asset Voting. No 
need for any vote threshold. Total representation in further process by choice.

For starters.

Election of an Assembly that is fully representative, where every 
seat was chosen directly or indirectly (through chosen "electors") by 
N voters, through voluntary cooperation rather than competition. And 
as to the dregs, represented by those electors who can't get it 
together to cooperate sufficiently, they are *still* represented in 
votes, if the electors -- who are identified public voters -- can 
still vote directly.

Existence of a large fully representative body (the "electoral 
college"), which can handle special elections, for example, 
efficiently and cheaply.

Possibility of recall of "seats" who no longer represent those who chose them.

Possibility of deciding all single-winner elections deliberatively, 
which is probably, properly done, better than any known single-ballot method.

And on and on.

And not a new idea. Asset Voting was described by Lewis Carroll 
(Charles Dodgeson) in the early 1880s as a tweak on Single 
Transferable Vote, to deal with exhausted ballots, allowing people 
without sufficient information to rank more than one to still 
participate even if they don't vote for one of the potential winners.

More information about the Election-Methods mailing list