[EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
abd at lomaxdesign.com
Mon Dec 1 10:31:38 PST 2008
At 12:54 AM 11/26/2008, Dave Ketchum wrote:
>>My own view is first that we're talking about marginal differences
>>here, and that PR vs single-winner elections is of much, much greater
>>interest, and second that the interesting difference
>>between plurality, IRV and other ranked methods is not in how they
>>count any particular profile, but rather in how they influence
>>candidate and voter behavior. In the IRV examples that Greg and
>>Abd adduce, we don't actually know what the ballots would have
>>looked like if the elections had used plurality. The set of
>>candidates might well have been different, the nature of the
>>campaigns different, and voter strategies different.
That's correct. We can make some reasonable assumptions, though. We
can look at Plurality elections and look at how many voters vote for
minor candidates with no hope of winning. We can then look at IRV
results and convert comparable percentages of these votes to
plurality votes for frontrunners. I think we could get pretty close.
Campaigns, from experience, don't seem to be much different. Voter
turnout doesn't seem to be much improved with IRV, though,
theoretically, it should improve turnout a little. The fact, however,
that the sincere preferences expressed by voters for minor candidates
don't shift results, in nearly all cases, acts contrary to this
effect, in the long run. So you get to vote "sincerely," but with no
net effect? You can "vote" more sincerely by giving a campaign
donation to a minor candidate!
Voter strategies in Plurality are based on main considerations:
(1) Vote for the favorite. This actually works, it's better than one
might think. It is *highly* likely to produce the same winner as a
more advanced method, and it is only under special conditions that it
fails. So a lot of voters do this. Note that, by definition, most
voters, voting this way, are voting for a frontrunner, so this
"sincere" strategy is the same as consideration 2.
(2) Vote for the preferred frontrunner, because all other votes are
moot. This is only important for minor party supporters who want to
express that for some other purpose than winning an election, such as
ballot position. Or for purely personal reasons, such as being pissed
at a party for not nominating their favorite, who is running, and
they either think that the possibility of the candidate from the
opposing part won't win in any case, or they don't care. Damn them
all! Yes, some voters vote like this, God bless them. It's part of
the system. Don't unnecessarily piss people off, make sure they see
the process as fair, if possible. Not always possible.
Which of these strategies the voter actually uses depends on
preference strength. Tricky to estimate, but, again, I think that by
studying average behavior, we could get close.
Essentially, we can look at IRV results and predict, probably within
a few percent, what the Plurality vote would have been. Most voters
probably use strategy 2 in Plurality; Plurality also tends to
suppress minor party candidacies which, with Plurality, show far
lower than the real party support, because of the strategic voting.
One of the benefits of Range, Warren calls it the "incubator effect,"
is that a measure of third party support becomes available, and there
is little reason to assume that this would be insincere. Why bother
voting an "insincere" rating for a non-viable candidate? Given that
the vote has about zero chance of influencing the outcome, in most elections.
(But if you prefer a major candidate, it could be foolish, with
Range, to max rate a minor candidate. It doesn't accurately represent
your preferences, but for no good strategic purpose. Only if you fear
that the minor candidate might be the runner-up, and lose to someone
worse, would you do that, and this means that you don't think this is
a minor candidate. This might be a winner. I've said this many times:
if you would seriously regret a Range Vote, under any reasonable
scenario, including some election surprise -- like Le Pen getting
second place -- don't vote that way. Adjust your vote so it is safer.
The Le Pen result was not expected, to be sure, but those French
elections, with many candidates, were very susceptible to small
variations. Had it been a Range election in the primary, Le Pen
wouldn't have made it to the runoff, I'm sure. *Maybe* Range would
have detected Jospin, maybe not. With "sincere" Range votes, sure.
But the Range winner, with no runoff, would almost certainly have
been Jospin. Note that IRV could easily have missed Jospin, for the
same reason that the plurality primary missed him. Jospin would have,
with even higher certainty, in a majority -required Range election,
been in a runoff against, again with high certainty, with Chirac, and
would have won.)
(FairVote, to criticize Range, posits a truly preposterous election
scenario, where voters prefer one candidate over another, and 99%
vote 100 for the favorite and 99 for the other. A very small set of
voters (1 or 1% in the example) vote 0 for the first and 100 for the
second, and, of course, this outweighs the preference of a huge
majority. But it is an extraordinarily weak preference, and if it was
accurate, all voters will be very satisfied with this outcome, and
they will not be saying "damn! I wish I'd voted like that selfish
voter!" They will be, instead, if this is a real election, and there
were other candidates who might have won, with significantly lower
preference, very happy with the outcome and they will all go out and
party together. In other words, FairVote wants us to think that the
violation of the Majority Criterion is a Bad Thing, when, in fact,
the outcome is very good, better than I have *ever* seen in a public
election. If that majority would regret its supposedly "sincere"
vote, why in the world did they vote that way, effectively abstaining
from an important pairwise election. Surely the exaggerated their
real preference toward the top. That is an error in voting, and
errors in voting can always produce poor results! In a real election,
how likely is this error?)
(We have 99% of the voters apparently thinking that there is a risk
that their favorite will lose, not to the second candidate, the 99,
but to someone much worse. However, in fact, there are *no* voters
who prefer the third candidate. If there is no third candidate --
FairVote doesn't specify -- then what we have is a situation where
the 99% majority essentially said, well, we have a tiny preference
for one candidate, but, really, don't listen to us unless the rest of
you really don't care. So they voted with votes of 1/100 vote value
in a binary election. Why? Only if they really don't care, this is
*almost* like a voter abstaining. Indeed, it's an almost total
abstention on the part of the voters. This vote is based on the idea
that voters are supposed to vote sincere absolute utilities, though
in this case, the utilities were normalized at the top but not at the
bottom. So the 99% may have been saying, I have a *significant*
preference for A over B, but because both A and B are not Genghis
Khan or Adolf Hitler, I'd have to be pretty grateful for the election
of either, so, to be honest with you, my preference for A over B is
only 1% -- tiny -- of my preference for B over C. I'd die to prevent
C from being elected. C isn't on the ballot? That's irrelevant, I'm
voting my "sincere utilities" because someone told me this was
better. And if they believed that, I can get rich, I can sell them
deeds to famous bridges. Voting is a choice, not a sentiment. If this
is a binary election, you are being asked to make a "sincere choice,"
not make a "sincere rating." You can rate "sincerely" if want, but if
you don't want to waste your vote, you will have to normalize your
vote to the candidate set at the bottom, too. Which would imply
voting min for B, if there are only two candidate. Voters *can* vote
as described, but, then, it *clearly* is based on a desire to
abstain. These are votes, expressed in fractions of a vote, multiples
of 1/100 vote, they are *not* sentiments. If you care about the
outcome, show it!)
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