[Election-Methods] elect the compromise

[raphfrk at netscape.net]

 From: Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <abd at lomaxdesign.com>
>As I see it, without doing a rigorous analysis -- far from it! --
>the contribution to each fund by each voter would rationally be their 
>utility for that fund's candidate winning, should they wish to share
>the burden of their own caucus. The tragedy of the commons 
>could apply to this.

 
More specifically, their max contribution would be equal to the difference in utility
between the option in question and the expected outcome of the election.

There is however still a negotiation step:

A: 100, B: 80, C: 20
These people need the per voter payout to exceed $20 for them to shift from A to B

A: 0, B: 80, C: 20
Each of these people would be willing to contribute $80 to shift the winner to B from A

(Actually, since they get their share of the payout, they will actually be willing to pay $145
each.? If B wins, they lose $145 but then get a payout share of $65 meaning that a B win
costs them $80.? I will ignore this effect as it makes it more complex.? It is also a free
rider inducing effect though).

Assuming 100 voters, there is 80*45 = $3600 available for bids to shift the result to B.

The total effective payout to the first faction needs to be $20*55 = $1100. 

At what point should the first faction switch?? The second faction won't pay more than $80 each
but that represents more than 3 times as much as the minimum the first faction will accept.

This is where negotiation may be necessary.? Also, for negotiation, accurate knowledge of 
the potential outcomes are necessary.? Where there are more than 3 options, it may not 
be clear which options have a chance of winning and also how much they are valued by the
other factions.

>There is no possibility for betrayal in this -- except, of course, 
> that corrupt trustees could abscond with the funds, but ordinary 
>escrow could be used for the funds.

There are some free rider issues with the proposal.? It is in the interests of each of the
members of the first group not to bid and hope that enough others bid.? The question is if
the fa system could handle that.? On each level of the chain, people would be known and
it may be hard to pull out.? At the leaf levels, your proxy might ring you up to remind you
to bid (and point out that if he doesn't get 80% of his clients to bid, he will make his
proxy look bad).? 

Also, both sides suffer from free rider problems.? There will be members of the first faction 
who switch at $20 and members of the second faction who won't bid enough.? Perhaps,
?the 2 effects would cancel.

Tabarrok proposed what he called dominant insurance contracts.? This may have applications
here.? A betting market also achieves the above more directly.? Even without using the market
itself to select the winner, trading on the market should make every voter indifferent to the
outcome.




Raphfrk
--------------------
Interesting site
"what if anyone could modify the laws"

www.wikocracy.com
 


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