[EM] danger of coercion (Re: First U.S. Scientific Election Audit...)

[Juho]

On May 14, 2007, at 5:22 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:

>> A simple and quite effective rule is to simply reject all votes that
>> have additional markings.

> And any write-in candidate involves extraneous marks.

Yes, the simplicity of ballots and the definition what markings are  
allowed are flexible concepts. Balance needed.

> The problem of miscounted ballots is very real.

> Incumbents, in general, may have access to the ballots (not  
> necessarily legally, but in practice).

> Fraud and corruption thrive in secrecy.

I'd recommend to consider calling the police (or some milder  
corrective steps), and to arrange the counting process so that  
representatives of all relevant parties are present. (I think a  
corrupt society and election process can be handled separately from  
the voter privacy related questions.)

> And, something seems to be forgotten here. Elections are about  
> aggregating votes. Rarely do a few votes matter.

Well, this matters at least to the individuals (and the mentality may  
escalate to wider circles too).

An example of impact to bigger groups: Females are a majority out of  
which considerable part could feel the pressure of their husbands.  
The opinions of the females could be considerably different than  
those of the males, so losing part of the female votes could  
influence the end result.

> I think that standing the whole system on its head to avoid a very  
> theoretical and unlikely scenario is nuts.

I think privacy in elections is a long standing healthy principle. No  
need to make radical changes. And if need arises, one can seek  
balance between different needs.

>>  Open votes also are likely to lead
>> to less votes to candidates that represent minorities and/or values
>> that the voter does not want to reveal publicly. This could apply to
>> minorities (political, ethnic, sexual, religious) or any deviation
>> from the family, village, working place or country tradition and
>> favoured values.
>
> Let me point out that in such an environment -- i.e., a minority  
> position is being hidden -- that minority position is unlikely to  
> win elections.

Maybe in some two-party single-winner elections.

> it has not been proposed that elections be public, only that  
> ballots be public.

I took your term "open voting" to include also fully open processes  
and replied according to that assumption. (Also your Town Meeting  
example seemed to have such open processes. I also understood that in  
the "direct democracy power transfers" privacy of the voters could be  
limited.)

> In the situation described, a voter who feared that a vote would be  
> considered "deviant" simply would not make any marks to identify  
> the ballot. Why would he or she do this?

In the case of coercion the cost could be e.g. one black eye. (And if  
the voting is public there's no need to even mark the ballot.)

> But, in any case, this is moot. We are not proposing public voting,  
> only that public voting does exist and does not seem to have the  
> level of problem that is being asserted.

What does word "we" refer to?

>> Therefore secret ballots are a good main rule (exceptions allowed but
>> justification needed).
>
> Secret ballot can be appropriate for elections; but I would reverse  
> what was said here. Secret ballot, in a mature system, would be the  
> exception, not the rule.

The emergence of that level of society might take time. I think for  
the coming years secrecy might still be the best main rule in normal  
public elections.

> It's quite difficult to corrupt direct democracy. Once the  
> transfers of power happen secretly, it becomes easier to corrupt.

These words seem to indicate that in direct democracy we would need  
to seek some balance between privacy and risk of corruption.

Juho



	
	
		
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