[EM] DAMC meets reasonable FBC

Jobst Heitzig heitzig-j at web.de
Wed Mar 14 04:49:41 PDT 2007

Dear Mike,

you wrote:
> Now, if DAMC meets GSFC, then it has an advantage that I value, over
> MDDA & MAMPO--but at great cost in complexity. And it's not dominated
> by wv Condorcet, because it trades Condorcet's Criterion for
> expectation FBC.

I think it does: Assume an absolute majority prefers X to Y and votes 
sincerely. Then X has an absolute majority defeat against Y. If also X 
but not Y is in the sincere Smith set, then Y has no absolute majority 
sized beatpath against X. Hence the only reason why the defeat X>Y 
could be skipped by DAMC would be if an even stronger defeat Z>Y is 
"locked in". Either way, Y ends up having a defeat against it locked 
in, and will therefore not win. Q.E.D.

Yours, Jobst
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