[EM] DAMC meets reasonable FBC
mikeo2106 at msn.com
Wed Mar 14 03:02:14 PDT 2007
The FBC that Ive been using is the one that requires that there be no way
of improving ones outcome by voting someone over ones favorite. That
strictest of FBCs is met by Approval, -1,0,1, MDDA, and MAMPO.
It appears that DAMC doesnt meet that FBC. But to know that voting some
particular candidate over your favorite will nearly complete a cycle that
would then be completed by a defeat of your compromise, thereby preventing
that defeat of your compromise from being kept--that would require pretty
much complete information about how the count will turn out. After all,
without that, voting some candidate over your favorite, if doing so will
partially complete a cycle, so as to keep some other defeat from being
kept--that could just as well hurt your compromise as help it. It would be
pure guessing. And, without knowing if that will help or hurt your outcome,
what youd be doing to your favorite tips the expectation-balance of that
favorite burial to the negative side.
So, if we judge by an FBC that requires that a voter wont improve his/her
expectation by voting someone over his/her favorite, without improbably
complete information, then DAMC passes that FBC.
The pair-wise count methods that could have even any FBC problem are methods
in which voting Compromise over Favorite can prevent a defeat of Compromise.
It doesnt take improbable predictive knowledge to know that doing that can
be expected to help Compromise, much more likely than hurting Compromise.
The usual Condorcet versions fail that FBC, and so the super-timid voter
isnt completely irrational when s/he votes Compromise over Favorite. S/he
is actually helping Compromises chances some. Personally I wouldnt
consider that tiny help for Compromise a justification to abandon Favorite.
I hope that with Condorcet people will be motivated more by hope than by
fear, and will rank sincerely, because of SFCs guarantee, even though
Condorcet almost surely fails even that more reasonable FBC.
Now, if DAMC meets GSFC, then it has an advantage that I value, over MDDA &
MAMPO--but at great cost in complexity. And it's not dominated by wv
Condorcet, because it trades Condorcet's Criterion for expectation FBC.
But one thing for sure: DAMC doesn't rival MDDA or MAMPO in their role,
because extreme simplicity and definition-brevity is part of their
advantage. As I said, DAMC is in the Condorcet complexity category.
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