[EM] Simmons' "solution" of voting system design puzzle is inadequate

[Chris Benham]

Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:

> Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
>
>At 05:00 PM 1/20/2007, Chris Benham wrote:
>
>  
>
>>By this definition Range fails "ICC" because voters can only express
>>preferences among clones by not giving maximum possible score to all of
>>them, thus making it
>>possible that if a narrow winner is replaced by a set of clones all the
>>clones lose.
>>    
>>
>
>Now, tell me, why should an election system provide a means for 
>voters to express a preference between clones, when they consider 
>them equally fit for the office?
>
>Benham is correct that Range would not allow a voter to express a max 
>score to one candidate and a lower score to another, without risking 
>the loss of the second one as he described. If a voter considers two 
>candidates clones, the rational vote under Range is to rate them 
>identically. "Favorite", between clones, is meaningless. If the voter 
>has a preference, they aren't clones to the voter.
>

Wrong. That is not how Warren defined clones for his purpose, nor is it 
how they are regularly
defined.

> *clones*
> A set of alternatives, X[1], X[2], .. X[m] is a clone set provided 
> that for
> every alternative Z, where Z is not one of X[1], .. X[m], the 
> following is true:
> Every ballot that ranks Z higher than one of X[1] .. X[m] ranks Z 
> higher than all of them.  Every ballot that ranks Z lower than one of 
> them, ranks Z lower than all of them.  No ballot ranks Z equal to any 
> of them.
> As well, there must be at least one alternative outside the set of 
> clones, and at least two alternatives in the set of clones.
>
So this:

>Now, tell me, why should an election system provide a means for 
>voters to express a preference between clones, when they consider 
>them equally fit for the office?
>
is more-or-less a contradiction in terms.


>Okay, so I looked up "clone." It has a special meaning; the term was 
>invented to apply to ranked methods. According to the current 
>Wikipedia article on Strategic Nomination:
>
>  
>
>>Clones in this context are candidates such that every voter ranks 
>>them the same relative to every other candidate, i.e. two clones of 
>>each other are never both strictly separated by a third member in 
>>the preference ranking of any voter, unless that member is also a fellow clone.
>>    
>>

Yes.


>Because of this definition, it is possible that all voters would rank 
>two candidates the same, but would sincerely rate them differently,..
>

I think you have that the wrong way round.


Chris Benham

>  
>
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