<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">
<html>
<head>
<meta content="text/html;charset=ISO-8859-1" http-equiv="Content-Type">
</head>
<body bgcolor="#ffffff" text="#000000">
<br>
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:<br>
<blockquote type="cite">Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
<pre wrap="">At 05:00 PM 1/20/2007, Chris Benham wrote:
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">By this definition Range fails "ICC" because voters can only express
preferences among clones by not giving maximum possible score to all of
them, thus making it
possible that if a narrow winner is replaced by a set of clones all the
clones lose.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!---->
Now, tell me, why should an election system provide a means for
voters to express a preference between clones, when they consider
them equally fit for the office?
Benham is correct that Range would not allow a voter to express a max
score to one candidate and a lower score to another, without risking
the loss of the second one as he described. If a voter considers two
candidates clones, the rational vote under Range is to rate them
identically. "Favorite", between clones, is meaningless. If the voter
has a preference, they aren't clones to the voter.</pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
Wrong. That is not how Warren defined clones for his purpose, nor is it
how they are regularly <br>
defined.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<p><a name="clones"></a><b>clones</b> <br>
A set of alternatives, X[1], X[2], .. X[m] is a clone set provided that
for <br>
every alternative Z, where Z is not one of X[1], .. X[m], the following
is true: <br>
Every ballot that ranks Z higher than one of X[1] .. X[m] ranks Z
higher than all of them. Every ballot that ranks Z lower than one of
them, ranks Z lower than all of them. No ballot ranks Z equal to any
of them. <br>
As well, there must be at least one alternative outside the set of
clones, and at least two alternatives in the set of clones.</p>
</blockquote>
So this:<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">Now, tell me, why should an election system provide a means for
voters to express a preference between clones, when they consider
them equally fit for the office?</pre>
</blockquote>
is more-or-less a contradiction in terms.<br>
<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">Okay, so I looked up "clone." It has a special meaning; the term was
invented to apply to ranked methods. According to the current
Wikipedia article on Strategic Nomination:
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">Clones in this context are candidates such that every voter ranks
them the same relative to every other candidate, i.e. two clones of
each other are never both strictly separated by a third member in
the preference ranking of any voter, unless that member is also a fellow clone.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!----></pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
Yes. <br>
<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">Because of this definition, it is possible that all voters would rank
two candidates the same, but would sincerely rate them differently,..</pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
I think you have that the wrong way round.<br>
<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
<blockquote cite="mid7.0.1.0.0.20070120231516.02683e98@lomaxdesign.com"
type="cite">
<pre wrap="">
</pre>
</blockquote>
</body>
</html>