[EM] EM] Simmons' "solution" of voting system design puzzle is inadequate

Chris Benham chrisjbenham at optusnet.com.au
Sun Jan 21 02:47:13 PST 2007

Warren Smith wrote:

>>Benham: By this definition Range fails "ICC" because voters can only express 
>preferences among clones by not giving maximum possible score to all of 
>them, thus making it
>possible that if a narrow winner is replaced by a set of clones all the 
>clones lose.
>--no.  The definition in the problem statement said "slight" preferences among clones.
>By slight, I meant, to be formal, infinitesimal.

Right. And how does a voter express an "infinitesimal" preference in  
the Range 0-99 that you advocate?

499: A99
251: B99>C98
250: C99>B98

Range average scores:  A49.401,    B49.349,  C49.348

A wins, but if the {B,C} clone set is coalesced into a single candidate 
X, X wins. This is an FPP-like failure of
Clone-Winner, and  BTW  also  of  course  a failure of  Majority  for  
Solid  Coalitions  (and Condorcet).

499: A99
501: X99

Range average scores:  X49.599,    A49.401

Apart from that, I gather that  Range with fewer available ratings 
slots  also qualifies as  "Range Voting", so
of  course in that case it is even more difficult  for  the voter  to 
express infinitesimal preferences.

Chris Benham

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