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Warren Smith wrote:<br>
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<pre wrap="">Benham: By this definition Range fails "ICC" because voters can only express
</pre>
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<pre wrap=""><!---->preferences among clones by not giving maximum possible score to all of
them, thus making it
possible that if a narrow winner is replaced by a set of clones all the
clones lose.
--no. The definition in the problem statement said "slight" preferences among clones.
By slight, I meant, to be formal, infinitesimal.</pre>
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Right. And how does a voter express an "infinitesimal" preference in
the Range 0-99 that you advocate?<br>
<br>
499: A99<br>
251: B99>C98<br>
250: C99>B98<br>
<br>
Range average scores: A49.401, B49.349, C49.348<br>
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A wins, but if the {B,C} clone set is coalesced into a single candidate
X, X wins. This is an FPP-like failure of<br>
Clone-Winner, and BTW also of course a failure of Majority for
Solid Coalitions (and Condorcet). <br>
<br>
499: A99<br>
501: X99<br>
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Range average scores: X49.599, A49.401<br>
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Apart from that, I gather that Range with fewer available ratings
slots also qualifies as "Range Voting", so<br>
of course in that case it is even more difficult for the voter to
express infinitesimal preferences.<br>
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Chris Benham<br>
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