[EM] EM] Simmons' "solution" of voting system design puzzle is inadequate

Warren Smith wds at math.temple.edu
Sat Jan 20 15:00:06 PST 2007

> Benham: By this definition Range fails "ICC" because voters can only express 
preferences among clones by not giving maximum possible score to all of 
them, thus making it
possible that if a narrow winner is replaced by a set of clones all the 
clones lose.

--no.  The definition in the problem statement said "slight" preferences among clones.
By slight, I meant, to be formal, infinitesimal.

> Benham: 
>>Note: Many voting systems are known (beyond just variants of range voting) which satisfy AFB
>Many?  There is MCA,  ER-Bucklin(Whole),  one or two Kevin Venzke 
methods and what else?

--the puzzle page I was citing, http://rangevoting.org/Puzzlepage.html
gives a hyperlink to a page explaining "many."
That page is  http://rangevoting.org/FBCsurvey.html
There are in fact an infinite set of such methods mentioned there, albeit most
are variants of range voting.

Warren D Smith

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