[EM] Beatpath and SSD aren't manipulable. "Manipulable" is barking up the

James Green-Armytage jarmyta at antioch-college.edu
Tue Nov 8 18:46:01 PST 2005

Mike Ossipoff wrote:
>The criteria SFC and SDSC describe why complying methods don't have a 
>problem with those offensive strategies.

Chris Benham wrote:
>46: A>B
>44: B>C   (sincere is B or B>A)
>10: C
>The defeat-dropper style  "Condorcet(wv)" method you refer to here 
>elects B.
>This looks a lot like vulnerability to  "offensive order-reversal"  (aka 
>Burial strategy) to  me.

Mike Ossipoff has long ago come to the conclusion that the vulnerability
of WV methods to the burying strategy is not worth worrying about. He
reaches this conclusion based on several assumptions (some stated and some
unstated) about strategic voting behavior. There are plenty of people who
believe that that the vulnerability of WV Condorcet to the burying
strategy *is* severe enough to be worth worrying about. There are also
some people who haven't made up their minds one way or the other about
whether the vulnerability is severe enough. I belong to this last

In my opinion, it is very hard to draw definite conclusions about
strategic behavior in methods that are rarely or never used for
high-stakes elections, because voter strategy as a phenomenon is very
complex, probably too complex to model definitively. Thus, I prefer to
make more tentative statements about strategy in methods that are largely
untried in high-stakes scenarios. When a strategic flaw is very obvious in
theory (e.g. as in the Borda count or margins Condorcet), I am happy to
reject the method out of hand, but when theoretical strategic
vulnerability is closer to the margin (as in WV Condorcet), I prefer to
reserve judgement.

We've been through all this several times before. At the moment, I have
nothing new to say on the topic. 

my best,

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