[EM] two more variations of MMPO
6049awj02 at sneakemail.com
Mon Jun 13 21:56:40 PDT 2005
Chris Benham chrisbenham-at-bigpond.com |EMlist| wrote:
> I agree with Kevin V.'s last post in this thread. You wrote:
>> The same considerations apply to the "top-two Approval pairwise
>> runoff" method I suggested a few days ago. If the "turkey raisers" or
>> cloners succeed, they have simply forced an effective reversion to
>> basic Approval.
> In terms of strategy and possible results, no, because in "basic
> Approval" no-one has any incentive to vote for a "turkey". Assuming the
> "turkey raisers" would prefer to elect a turkey
> rather than one of the candidates from the rival faction of
> turkey-raisers, then they have two levels of success: (1) to prevent the
> election of a candidate from there rival faction of
> turkey-raisers, and (2) to elect one of their own candidates. It is
> possible that the net effect of the turkey-raising is that the final
> runoff will be between two turkeys, a complete
> Also it is unfair that parties with the resources to run two candidates
> should have an (extra) advantage (in terms of the voting system maths)
> over parties who can only afford to run one.
I agree. The same consideration applies to two-round runoff, of course,
which is in widespread use.
> And if we are going to use ranked ballots with an Approval
> cutoff, why not something reasonable to good like
> Smith//Approval, DMC or AM?
Yes, I think those first two are solid (but I forgot what AM stands
for). I think I actually lean toward Smith/Approval. Its one slight
disadvantage is the requirement to explicitly define and determine the
Smith set, which DMC avoids. Not that that's difficult to do, of course.
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