[EM] two more variations of MMPO

[Russ Paielli]

Chris Benham chrisbenham-at-bigpond.com |EMlist| wrote:
> Russ,
> I agree with  Kevin V.'s last post in this thread.  You wrote:
> 
>> The same considerations apply to the "top-two Approval pairwise 
>> runoff" method I suggested a few days ago. If the "turkey raisers" or 
>> cloners succeed, they have simply forced an effective reversion to 
>> basic Approval. 
> 
> 
> In terms of strategy and possible results, no, because in "basic 
> Approval" no-one has any incentive to vote for a "turkey". Assuming the 
> "turkey raisers" would prefer to elect a turkey
> rather than one of the candidates from the rival faction of 
> turkey-raisers, then they have two levels of success: (1) to prevent the 
> election of a candidate from there rival faction of
> turkey-raisers, and (2) to elect one of  their own candidates. It is 
> possible that the net effect of  the turkey-raising is that the final 
> runoff  will be between two turkeys, a complete
> fiasco.
> Also it is unfair that parties with the resources to run two candidates 
> should have an (extra) advantage (in terms of the voting system maths) 
> over parties who can only afford to run one.

I agree. The same consideration applies to two-round runoff, of course, 
which is in widespread use.

> And  if   we  are going to use ranked  ballots  with  an  Approval  
> cutoff,  why  not   something  reasonable to good  like  
> Smith//Approval,  DMC  or  AM?

Yes, I think those first two are solid (but I forgot what AM stands 
for). I think I actually lean toward Smith/Approval. Its one slight 
disadvantage is the requirement to explicitly define and determine the 
Smith set, which DMC avoids. Not that that's difficult to do, of course.

--Russ