[EM] two more variations of MMPO

Chris Benham chrisbenham at bigpond.com
Sun Jun 12 06:55:23 PDT 2005

I agree with  Kevin V.'s last post in this thread.  You wrote:

> The same considerations apply to the "top-two Approval pairwise 
> runoff" method I suggested a few days ago. If the "turkey raisers" or 
> cloners succeed, they have simply forced an effective reversion to 
> basic Approval. 

In terms of strategy and possible results, no, because in "basic 
Approval" no-one has any incentive to vote for a "turkey". Assuming the 
"turkey raisers" would prefer to elect a turkey
rather than one of the candidates from the rival faction of 
turkey-raisers, then they have two levels of success: (1) to prevent the 
election of a candidate from there rival faction of
turkey-raisers, and (2) to elect one of  their own candidates. It is 
possible that the net effect of  the turkey-raising is that the final 
runoff  will be between two turkeys, a complete
Also it is unfair that parties with the resources to run two candidates 
should have an (extra) advantage (in terms of the voting system maths) 
over parties who can only afford to run one.

And  if   we  are going to use ranked  ballots  with  an  Approval  
cutoff,  why  not   something  reasonable to good  like  
Smith//Approval,  DMC  or  AM?

Chris  Benham

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