[EM] two more variations of MMPO

Kevin Venzke stepjak at yahoo.fr
Sat Jun 11 19:39:02 PDT 2005


--- Russ Paielli <6049awj02 at sneakemail.com> a écrit :
> Yes, but if the "turkey raisers" succeed, what have they accomplished? 
> They have simply forced "MMPO top-two pairwise runoff" to effectively 
> revert to MMPO. Anyone who likes MMPO (and I realize you're not one) can 
> hardly complain about that. By the way, the "turkey raisers" risk 
> electing a turkey. Therefore I still see no valid argument against the 
> top-two runoff idea for MMPO. Am I missing something?

I doubt top-two runoff MMPO satisfies FBC.

> The same applies for clones. If two identical clones get into the 
> runoff, all that has happened is an effective reversion to basic MMPO.
> The same considerations apply to the "top-two Approval pairwise runoff" 
> method I suggested a few days ago. If the "turkey raisers" or cloners 
> succeed, they have simply forced an effective reversion to basic Approval.

But what's the point? Do you feel that any kind of runoff must improve the 
method? MMPO and Approval seem to be poor choices for picking two finalists.

> In the Approval case, the only valid argument that I can see against the 
> top-two runoff idea is that it requires ranked ballots. You can argue 
> that the gain, whatever it is, does not justify the additional 
> complexity. But however small the gain may be, it is not a loss.

I don't agree. Simplicity is very valuable. Also, it adds order-reversal
incentive to Approval (due to turkey-raising potential).

Kevin Venzke


Appel audio GRATUIT partout dans le monde avec le nouveau Yahoo! Messenger 
Téléchargez cette version sur http://fr.messenger.yahoo.com

More information about the Election-Methods mailing list