[EM] two more variations of MMPO
Russ Paielli
6049awj02 at sneakemail.com
Sat Jun 11 13:12:39 PDT 2005
Chris Benham chrisbenham-at-bigpond.com |EMlist| wrote:
> Russ,
> You wrote:
>
>> I'd like to throw out a couple more ideas I've had for variations of
>> MMPO. I'm not certain, but I think they might retain the key
>> properties of MMPO.
>>
>> Suggestion 1: MMPO top-two pairwise runoff
>>
>> Find the top two MMPO candidates and select the one who wins the
>> pairwise race between them. This method uses no Approval cutoff.
>>
>> Suggestion 2: MMPO/Approval runoff
>>
>> This method uses an Approval cutoff and is similar to the one I
>> suggested a few days ago but a bit simpler. The Approval winner and
>> the MMPO winner have a pairwise runoff to select the final winner.
>>
>> Comments?
>
>
> Yes. Top-two runoff methods have ridiculous "turkey-raising" incentives.
Yes, but if the "turkey raisers" succeed, what have they accomplished?
They have simply forced "MMPO top-two pairwise runoff" to effectively
revert to MMPO. Anyone who likes MMPO (and I realize you're not one) can
hardly complain about that. By the way, the "turkey raisers" risk
electing a turkey. Therefore I still see no valid argument against the
top-two runoff idea for MMPO. Am I missing something?
The same applies for clones. If two identical clones get into the
runoff, all that has happened is an effective reversion to basic MMPO.
The same considerations apply to the "top-two Approval pairwise runoff"
method I suggested a few days ago. If the "turkey raisers" or cloners
succeed, they have simply forced an effective reversion to basic Approval.
In the Approval case, the only valid argument that I can see against the
top-two runoff idea is that it requires ranked ballots. You can argue
that the gain, whatever it is, does not justify the additional
complexity. But however small the gain may be, it is not a loss.
--Russ
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