[EM] two more variations of MMPO

Russ Paielli 6049awj02 at sneakemail.com
Mon Jun 13 22:59:23 PDT 2005

Russ Paielli 6049awj02-at-sneakemail.com |EMlist| wrote:
> Chris Benham chrisbenham-at-bigpond.com |EMlist| wrote:
>> Russ,
>> I agree with  Kevin V.'s last post in this thread.  You wrote:
>>> The same considerations apply to the "top-two Approval pairwise 
>>> runoff" method I suggested a few days ago. If the "turkey raisers" or 
>>> cloners succeed, they have simply forced an effective reversion to 
>>> basic Approval. 
>> In terms of strategy and possible results, no, because in "basic 
>> Approval" no-one has any incentive to vote for a "turkey". Assuming 
>> the "turkey raisers" would prefer to elect a turkey
>> rather than one of the candidates from the rival faction of 
>> turkey-raisers, then they have two levels of success: (1) to prevent 
>> the election of a candidate from there rival faction of
>> turkey-raisers, and (2) to elect one of  their own candidates. It is 
>> possible that the net effect of  the turkey-raising is that the final 
>> runoff  will be between two turkeys, a complete
>> fiasco.
>> Also it is unfair that parties with the resources to run two 
>> candidates should have an (extra) advantage (in terms of the voting 
>> system maths) over parties who can only afford to run one.
> I agree. The same consideration applies to two-round runoff, of course, 
> which is in widespread use.

Wrong again, Russ, you ******* *****. It doesn't apply to two-round 
runoff because voters are not allowed to approve multiple candidates.


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