[EM] Re: How to vote in Approval

[Russ Paielli]

MIKE OSSIPOFF nkklrp-at-hotmail.com |EMlist| wrote:

<cut>
> Russ continued:
> 
> The "strategy" boils down to a single, short
> inequality, but Mike got wrapped around the axle trying to explain it.
> Mike also failed to recognize that there is really only one "strategy,"
> with several corollaries for special cases.
> 
> I reply:
> 
> It would seem that, according to Russ, we've all been mistaken then :-) 
> We here, and Fishburn & Tideman, and a various other authors on Approval 
> strategy. Surely Russ will write to those authors to let them know their 
> error.
> 
> Many strategies can be related to Weber's strategy of voting for 
> candidates with positive strategic value, according to Weber's strategic 
> value formula. But that doesn't make them the same strategy, as we've 
> been using the term here. Only Russ claims that to vote for whichever of 
> the 2 expected frontrunners one prefers to the other, and for everyone 
> whom one likes better is the same strategy as voting for all the 
> candidates who seem better than the election's expected value--one's 
> perceived expectation in the election.

If only two candidates have any chance of winning, then the 
"best-frontrunner" strategy is a corollary of Weber's formula. If other 
candidates have a chance of winning, then it is not necessarily the 
optimal way to vote. Sure, it's a "strategy," but it's not an optimal 
one. I could just as well say that my football "strategy" is to always 
go for it on fourth down. Yes, it's a "strategy," but it's not a very 
good one. It's not optimal. Any strategy that is not consistent with 
Weber's formula for some reasonable set of inputs is not optimal. Are 
you taking notes, Mike?

> Russ continued:
> 
> Then he has the nerve to chide me for pointing out the *real*
> potential problem with Approval, which is that voters will depend
> largely on polling results, which could be inaccurate or deliberately
> manipulated.
> 
> I reply:
> 
> But it's common knowledge here that voters in Approval won't depend on 
> polling results. That's been explained to you a number of times, but 
> you'll never understand it, and that's ok. I'm not going to repeat why 
> voters won't depend on polling results, because I've repeated it for you 
> enough times already.

Yes, it is true that voters won't "depend on polling results," but you 
are the one who claimed that voters will have some idea of how popular 
the candidates are. How will they know that, Mike? By word of mouth? 
Yes, the previous election results will provide some information, but 
... I'm not going to waste my time repeating myself again, Mike. When 
you don't want to hear something, you are *very* good at not hearing it.

> Russ continued:
> 
> , it has little bearing on
> reality. Approval may "converge on the sincere Smith set" if voters base
> their votes on previous elections only (ignoring pre-election polls)
> 
> I reply:
> 
> Which they'll do, if they know what they're doing.
> 
> Russ continued:
> 
> and if EVERYTHING IS STATIC. In other words, it is only true if all the
> candidates are the same and the issues and concerns of voters haven't
> changed one bit from previous elections. Is that reality? Of course not.
> 
> I reply:
> 
> Sure, the electorate might be completely and radically unlike it was 
> before :-) But that isn't likely. And if that isn't the case, then 
> Approval converges as some of us have been describing.  Approval 
> strategy is typicallly based on best estimates, Russ.

Oh, listen to Mr. Precise. Either the electorate is "completely and 
radically unlike it was before :-)" or it is so nearly identical that 
mathematical convergence can be asserted. Mike, the mathematical 
convergence property that you parrot only applies in the idealized case 
in which everything is static: candidates, issues, voter attitudes, etc. 
Yes, it may still apply approximately if the changes are small, but I 
doubt you or anyone else has analyzed the sensitivity of the convergence 
to the changes.

By the way, I would like to know what the significance is of those 
little ":-)" symbols you sprinkly throughout your messages. Do you think 
its funny when you make an ass of yourself?

> Russ continued:
> 
> But in Mike's little world, reality doesn't matter much. Clue for Mike:
> some voters actually check out candidates rather than blindly voting for
> party only.
> 
> I reply:
> 
> I wasn't aware that I or anyone else had said that the convergence 
> depends on party voting. If the electorate can be expected to be 
> anything like it was in the previous election, then the vote totals of 

Oh, I see. Is "anything like" a mathematical term, or is it something 
you pulled out of your rear end?

Clue for Mike: if a voter's approval strategy depends on the previous 
election results, yet all the parties (except perhaps for the incumbent 
party) have new candidates, then the voter is voting by party rather 
than by candidate. That would be obvious to anyone who doesn't have his 
head stuck in his rear end.