[EM] Re: How to vote in Approval
MIKE OSSIPOFF
nkklrp at hotmail.com
Mon Feb 21 12:00:22 PST 2005
Russ said:
As you may recall, when Mike Ossipoff backed out of ElectionMethods.org
a couple of months ago and declared that it was "canceled
I reply:
electionmethods.org no longer exists in any meaningful sense. It isn't the
website that it was. It's now a repository of things that you (Russ) have
copied here & there, or from me. And anything original that is there,
written by you, is likely to be as ignorant as your postings here. Like your
discovery that there is only one Approval strategy. I admit that I haven't
had time to check what your website is like now.
Russ continued:
," he demanded
that I remove all the material that he had a hand in. I had written most
of the articles myself
I reply:
...copying material that was from me. Typically rewording it sloppily and
ambiguously.
Russ continued:
Three of the articles Mike had written were on Approval "strategy." I
removed those articles, but I have now written one short article to
replace them.
I reply:
As I said, electionmethods.org isn't what it was.
Russ continued:
As I wrote before, I had been lazy and depended on Mike to some extent
for source material. What I discovered in researching Approval
"strategy" myself is that Mike's articles made a very simple problem
seem very complicated.
I reply:
Because some of the strategy methods involved a little elementarly algebra?
Russ, I made it clear in the 1st article that you don't need the algebra,
and that Approval strategly can be as simple as you want it to be. The more
"complicated" strategy methods are optional. What I suggest to you is: Vote
for the candidate for whom you'd vote in Approval, and for everyone whom you
like better. I hope that you're not going to say that that is too
complicated.
Anyway, some of the algebra was merely to demonstrate that, with a few
reasonable approximations, Forest's Better-Than-Expectation strategy
maximizes the voter's expectation.
Russ continued:
The "strategy" boils down to a single, short
inequality, but Mike got wrapped around the axle trying to explain it.
Mike also failed to recognize that there is really only one "strategy,"
with several corollaries for special cases.
I reply:
It would seem that, according to Russ, we've all been mistaken then :-) We
here, and Fishburn & Tideman, and a various other authors on Approval
strategy. Surely Russ will write to those authors to let them know their
error.
Many strategies can be related to Weber's strategy of voting for candidates
with positive strategic value, according to Weber's strategic value formula.
But that doesn't make them the same strategy, as we've been using the term
here. Only Russ claims that to vote for whichever of the 2 expected
frontrunners one prefers to the other, and for everyone whom one likes
better is the same strategy as voting for all the candidates who seem better
than the election's expected value--one's perceived expectation in the
election.
Russ continued:
Mike is a real character. He still occasionally posts a message about
Approval "strategy" in which he implies that he has discovered something
new.
I reply:
I haven't really claimed to be the discoverer of Approval strategy. And when
I post an Approval strategy that hasn't been posted before here, I don't
state that I've discovered something new. But do I post it as if I've
discovered something new? Well, if I discovered something new, I'd post it,
and so yes, in that sense, if someone posts something, they indeed post it
as if they'd discovered something new.
Russ continued:
Then he has the nerve to chide me for pointing out the *real*
potential problem with Approval, which is that voters will depend
largely on polling results, which could be inaccurate or deliberately
manipulated.
I reply:
But it's common knowledge here that voters in Approval won't depend on
polling results. That's been explained to you a number of times, but you'll
never understand it, and that's ok. I'm not going to repeat why voters won't
depend on polling results, because I've repeated it for you enough times
already.
Russ continued:
Mike completely fails to understand the problem because he
is an uneducated amateur.
I reply:
And presumably Russ considers to be uneducated amateurs all of the people
here who have tried to explain to Russ that voters won't depend on polling.
Well, we can't all be professional experts like Russ :-)
Russ continued:
In one very condescending reply to one of my earlier messages, Mike wrote,
"But the "Smith set" that Approval converges to is what is called the
sincere Smith set, the set of candidates who are all publicly preferred
to every candidate outside that set--where X is publicly preferred to Y
if more voters prefer X to Y than vice-versa."
What Mike failed to point out, and probably doesn't even know, is that
his statement may be true in a limited sense
I repy:
But youi're the one who had said it, as a reason for you to believe that
Approval is equivalent to pairwise/random :-)
Russ continued:
, it has little bearing on
reality. Approval may "converge on the sincere Smith set" if voters base
their votes on previous elections only (ignoring pre-election polls)
I reply:
Which they'll do, if they know what they're doing.
Russ continued:
and if EVERYTHING IS STATIC. In other words, it is only true if all the
candidates are the same and the issues and concerns of voters haven't
changed one bit from previous elections. Is that reality? Of course not.
I reply:
Sure, the electorate might be completely and radically unlike it was before
:-) But that isn't likely. And if that isn't the case, then Approval
converges as some of us have been describing. Approval strategy is
typicallly based on best estimates, Russ.
Russ continued:
But in Mike's little world, reality doesn't matter much. Clue for Mike:
some voters actually check out candidates rather than blindly voting for
party only.
I reply:
I wasn't aware that I or anyone else had said that the convergence depends
on party voting. If the electorate can be expected to be anything like it
was in the previous election, then the vote totals of candidates and
proposals in the election give voters information on what candidates or
proposals will outpoll others in the next election. It's a good and
reasonable assumption that the electorate is as it was in the previous
election. If we were dealt a new and randomly radically different electorate
each time, then that would be different. All of this has been
well-understood here long befroe Russ began posting.
Typically the electorate of the previous election is the best estimate for
the electorate of the current election, and so that's a reasonable basis for
Approval strategy, which, you should try to remember, is often based on
probabilities and estimates rather than certainties.
Russ continued:
The difference between Mike and me is that I realize I am an amateur in
the field of voting systems
I reply:
If you really realize that, Russ, then don't keep expouding from ignorance.
Russ continued:
, but he thinks he is a professional.
I reply:
Russ has said that before. It isn't entirely clear why Russ believes that I
believe that I'm a professional. I haven't said that I'm a professional, so
that can't be why Russ thinks that I believe that I'm a professional. But
then, Russ's statements and beliefs, in general, aren't based on anything
other than what is in Russ's mind.
Russ continued:
I *am*
a professional in another field (aerospace engineering)
I reply:
Russ is still repeating that brag. If it's even true, Russ, do your
employers know that you're here repeatedly boasting of your employment with
them, and trying to use it to gain authority for your pretentiously ignorant
postings here? If you really have the employment that you claim to, you
aren't being a very good credit to the aerospace industry.
Russ continued:
, and I have
published several peer-reviewed technical papers
(http://RussP.org/publist.htm), so I at least have some inkling about
what it means to be a professional.
I reply:
Russ desperately needs your approval and recognition for his alleged
accomplishments elsewhere. So:
Good for you, Russ! You did good, Russ!
Does that help any?
Look, Russ, you keep repeating that there's something that you're good at.
If that's true, then it would probably be better if you would stick to that.
Russ continued:
I realize that I am have not made
any original contributions to the theory of election methods (unless you
count "summability"). On the other hand, Mike is not a professional in
any field, yet he is a legend in his own mind on election methods.
I reply:
But when did I say that I was a legend? Or did Russ determine that by ESP?
Or do Russ's statements have any connection with anything other than Russ's
desire to believe?
And what field would Russ like me to be a professional in? Russ hasn't quite
explained what bearing being good at one thing has on the validity of what
someone says about another topic. Russ wants his boasts of accomplishments
elsewhere to give authoritly to the pretentious ignorance that he posts
here.
Has Mike ever published a peer-reviewed paper on election methods? Has
he ever even published a conference paper? Has he written a book or even
an article in a widely read publication?
I reply:
People who publish in journals have a PhD. I don't have a Phd. Aside from
that, I have no idea whether those who review articles for journals would be
interested in the goal of getting rid of the lesser-of-2-evils problem. I've
always made it clear that what I say is only for those who agree with me
about the importance of the goal of getting rid of the lesser-of-2-evils
problem. That can be more generally described as the goal of minimizing need
for defensive strategy, as I've defined that term. That is, reducing the
range of situations in which defensive strategy is needed, and reducing the
drasticness of defensive strategy that is needed.
Publish a book? Russ asked me to write a book with him, but I didn't have
time. Conference paper? I haven't attended voting system conferences. Should
I? I haven't felt that the value of such conferences would justify the trip.
Mike Ossipoff
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