[EM] IRV's "majority winner". What if we let the people choose?
Forest Simmons
fsimmons at pcc.edu
Tue May 25 19:09:02 PDT 2004
Back when there was a push to get an IRV initiative on the Oregon ballot I
sat in on some of the FairVoteOregon meetings, including the one in which
the final wording of the initiative and the wording of the voter
information pamphlet entry were being hashed out.
All the rhetoric was repetition of the claim that IRV is the method that
picks the majority winner, and that the principle of majority rule is the
foundation of IRV, as well as the foundation of democracy.
So when Mike suggested letting a majority decide between the IRV winner
and the Condorcet Winner, he wasn't unfairly foisting Condorcet standards
on IRV supporters. He was just giving them a chance to practice what they
preach. In essence he exposed their hypocrisy by calling their bluff.
Forest
On Tue, 18 May 2004, Curt Siffert wrote:
>
> Not to defend IRV, but I agree with James on this count. If a thin
> majority preferred B to A, but then found after the election that A
> received many first place votes, while B received hardly any, I'd bet
> money that some people would switch their votes from B to A, possibly
> enough to swing the results.
>
> I followed the Dem primary pretty closely and there were a *lot* of
> voters that were voting for Kerry even though they liked Dean better -
> not for tactical reasons, but simply because it was the thing to do.
>
> I know that it doesn't make sense and isn't rational, but the point is
> that people are irrational. And while that doesn't mean that awarding
> the winner to the Condorcet Winner is flawed (of course it's not
> flawed), there are still weird cases like this one where it could be a
> public relations problem. People are used to first place counting for
> more than second or third place, and it would be an uphill battle to
> convince an unsophisticated population that B is the rightful winner.
>
> It's not a reason to support IRV, but it's definitely reason to try and
> include safeguards so an outcome like this wouldn't happen.
>
> On May 18, 2004, at 7:53 PM, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
>
> >
> > James Gilmour said:
> >
> > But if you did decide this by a separate run-off election, I should
> > not be surprised to find large
> > numbers of voters changing their preferences in that run-off election,
> > and in so doing, reject the
> > CW.
> >
> > I reply:
> >
> > Why should they change their preference, James? So that IRV's winner
> > will win? If you prefer C to B, and that's why you ranked C over B,
> > you're making a ridiculous claim if you say that you're now going to
> > start liking B better than C.
> >
> > You continued:
> >
> > Imagine a "real-life" scenario: Bush, Gore, Nader. Would we really
> > have had four years of
> > President Nader?
> >
> > I reply:
> >
> > Yes we would, if 52% prefer Nader to Gore Bush, and 48 prefer Bush to
> > Nader, and we held a runoff between Bush and Nader, for a presidential
> > election. Then yes, James, we'd have had at least 4 or 8 years of
> > President Nader.
> >
> > You continued:
> >
> > This is about more than voting arithmetic and measures for identifying
> > "the most
> > representative candidate". It brings in systems of values which are
> > expressed in different
> > dimensions from those used to measure representivity.
> >
> > I reply:
> >
> > I have no idea what you're talkling about. Perhaps your "system of
> > values" happens to coincide with the definition of IRV? :-)
> >
> > Mike Ossipoff
> >
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