[EM] IRV's "majority winner". What if we let the people choose?

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

James Gilmour said:

No, there is no sophistry in my argument.

I reply:

Call it what you want. You're saying we shoudn't respect the voted wishes of 
those people because you think that they might change their preferences. 
Does it occur to you that that is a rather weak argument for disregarding 
someone's voted wishes?

Though you're not at all clear about what you mean, you seem to be implying 
that you mean that when people find out that C is favorite of fewest, then 
people who prefer C to B will feel a need to follow the herd, and the fact 
that C is favorite of fewest will make those people begin to prefer B to C, 
because B has a higher Plurality score than C does. Whatever reasons made 
those people prefer C to B, they'll consider Plurality score to be a more 
important thing to judge the candidates by,and so now they'll think that B 
must  be better than C. Is that pretty much how your reasoning goes?

Adam had said:

>You're essentially saying that those preferences shouldn't be respected, 
>since the people wouldn't actually express them if they had thought they 
>mattered.

You then said:

No. that is not what I am saying.  I am suggesting they would vote sincerely 
but then reject the
outcome of their own actions when they saw the consequences and all the 
evidence.

I reply:

You mean the dire consequence that someone whom they prefer to B mighrt win 
instead of B? :-)

What is "all the evidence"? The fact that C doesn't get a high Plurality 
score? They're going to judge candidates by their Pluralitly score instead 
of by the practical criteria which initially informed their preferences?

You continued:

I am also
suggesting that if they fully understood that such outcomes were possible, 
they would reject a
voting system that could produce such an outcome.

I reply:

One issue at a time, if you don't mind. But now you're saying that if they 
knew that Condorcet would elect someone whom they prefer more, that would 
cause them to reject Condorcet and choose IRV, because it would elect 
someone whom they prefer less.

> >This is about more than voting arithmetic and measures for identifying
> >"the most representative candidate".  It brings in systems of values 
>which >are expressed in different dimensions from those used to measure 
>representativity.
>

Adam had said:

>I don't understand this.

I reply:

James was talking gibberish, and I doubt that anyone could know what he was 
trying to say.

James replied:

That is exactly the problem.  NB nothing personal, just a general 
observation about much of the
discussion on this list.

I reply:

What is exactly the problem? The fact that people don't know what you mean 
when you talk gibberish, and then fail to explain what you meant?


>Are you trying to say that people might not vote in a way that pairwise 
>counting measures meaningfully?  If so, could you  justify that?

James said:

...but all my political experience leads me to believe that such a result 
would provoke a
massive public outcry and demands for immediate changes to the voting 
system.

I reply:

If you want pubic resenrtment of the outcome, then let IRV avoidably elect 
someone over whom a majority have expressed preference for someone else. 
That majority loser whom IRV elects will never have the legitimacy that the 
CW would have.

You continued:

As others have appreciated, such a response operates on a different 
dimension from that used to
assess "representativity" as defined by the comparisons of Condorcet, IRV, 
etc.  You may think this
contrary, but we know from political surveys that real people are quite 
capable of holding contrary
views and even mutually incompatible views.  So while they might accept the 
CW on one dimension,
they will reject the outcome of the election on another dimension.  I don't 
have a neat definition
for that dimension, but it is characterised by the reactions I suggested in 
the two different
scenarios, ie accept CW if 32/35/33, but reject CW if 3/49/48.

I reply:

So you justify your prediction by a "dimension", for which you don't have a 
defiintition, except that it is characterized by the prediction which you 
use it to justify.

You say that there would be an "outcry" when Condorcet elected C, in your 
example. Who is going to do the outrcrying? The majority who prefer C to B, 
or the majority who prefer C to A? :-)

Mike Ossipoff

_________________________________________________________________
FREE pop-up blocking with the new MSN Toolbar – get it now! 
http://toolbar.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200415ave/direct/01/