[EM] electoral college/Serious thoughts

Dave Ketchum davek at clarityconnect.com
Sat May 1 21:45:02 PDT 2004


On Sat, 1 May 2004 19:55:20 -0700 Curt Siffert wrote:

> Dave -
> 
> I had a little trouble understanding what you wrote in your original 
> email.  But I don't think you have it wrong... I think.
> 
> I don't think awarding by congressional district is a good idea, due to 
> gerrymandering, and due to the scenario you describe (10 A electors).
> 
> I do think the best idea is to award EVs on a state level, 
> proportionally, depending on the popular vote in that state.  Assuming I 
> interpret your view correctly here, I agree with you.  At least, I agree 
> theoretically.  The problem is that I don't see how to implement it fairly.
> 
> I think there is a problem in determining the percentage order of 
> finishers in a state, though.  To proportionally award EVs, you need to 
> be able to communicate the winners in a form relative to 100%:
> 
> 49%  Bush
> 48%  Kerry
> 3%   Nader
> 
> You can do this with plurality, by only counting up first place votes, 
> but you get right back to the spoiler problems.  Since IRV focuses on 
> first-place votes, it has the same problem.
> 

I was saying count the votes purely by Plurality rules (as is done now), 
and then award electors proportionally.  Spoiler problem exists, but IS 
NOT so serious as in current winner take all.

Looking at the above votes, Bush and Kerry each get about half the state's 
electors and in big-enough states, such as NY, Nader gets about one.

IRV and Condorcet are oriented to winner-take-all - which is exactly what 
I wish to escape.


> And Condorcet is not reliably communicable in this way.  How would you 
> approximate 100% worth of consensus, and communicate that Nader got x% 
> of that consensus, Kerry got x% of that consensus, etc?
> 
> In this example:
> 
> A->B: 60-40
> A->C: 51-49
> B->C: 51-49
> 
> A is the CW.  If A is ignored, B beats C.   However, C is a lot closer 
> to winning than B is, in terms of vote-switching cost.  If C was given 
> less EVs than B, C would have a very convincing political argument to 
> make in protest.
> 
> A few threads ago we talked about what sort of math to use to figure 
> this out - I'm still going through them to see how they fit a variety of 
> scenarios, but so far I'm not sure any of those counting ideas we've 
> come up with so far are robust enough for a presidential election.
> 
> So, due to my inability to see a clearly fair way to determine how to 
> award proportional strength, under any vote-counting system, I am having 
> trouble advocating proportional EV.
> 
> (The other problem is we'd have have to remove the thing that says if 
> anyone gets less than 270 EVs, it would go the House - this approach 
> makes the scenario much more likely.)
> 

Disagreed.  I anticipated Nader getting some electors - but so few there 
is no chance of his becoming President.  Those who nominate these electors 
could, as part of the nomination process, specify how they shall act if 
Nader is not about to win (some states have laws on this topic to consider 
obeying, or getting rewritten).

ALSO, how is getting the House involved on ties a disaster?


> Curt

-- 
  davek at clarityconnect.com    people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
  Dave Ketchum   108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708   607-687-5026
            Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
                  If you want peace, work for justice.




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