[EM] electoral college/Serious thoughts

[Curt Siffert]

Dave -

I had a little trouble understanding what you wrote in your original 
email.  But I don't think you have it wrong... I think.

I don't think awarding by congressional district is a good idea, due to 
gerrymandering, and due to the scenario you describe (10 A electors).

I do think the best idea is to award EVs on a state level, 
proportionally, depending on the popular vote in that state.  Assuming 
I interpret your view correctly here, I agree with you.  At least, I 
agree theoretically.  The problem is that I don't see how to implement 
it fairly.

I think there is a problem in determining the percentage order of 
finishers in a state, though.  To proportionally award EVs, you need to 
be able to communicate the winners in a form relative to 100%:

49%  Bush
48%  Kerry
3%   Nader

You can do this with plurality, by only counting up first place votes, 
but you get right back to the spoiler problems.  Since IRV focuses on 
first-place votes, it has the same problem.

And Condorcet is not reliably communicable in this way.  How would you 
approximate 100% worth of consensus, and communicate that Nader got x% 
of that consensus, Kerry got x% of that consensus, etc?

In this example:

A->B: 60-40
A->C: 51-49
B->C: 51-49

A is the CW.  If A is ignored, B beats C.   However, C is a lot closer 
to winning than B is, in terms of vote-switching cost.  If C was given 
less EVs than B, C would have a very convincing political argument to 
make in protest.

A few threads ago we talked about what sort of math to use to figure 
this out - I'm still going through them to see how they fit a variety 
of scenarios, but so far I'm not sure any of those counting ideas we've 
come up with so far are robust enough for a presidential election.

So, due to my inability to see a clearly fair way to determine how to 
award proportional strength, under any vote-counting system, I am 
having trouble advocating proportional EV.

(The other problem is we'd have have to remove the thing that says if 
anyone gets less than 270 EVs, it would go the House - this approach 
makes the scenario much more likely.)

Curt


On May 1, 2004, at 7:11 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:

> I am looking at responses from Curt, Paul, and Adam.  They seem to 
> think I have it wrong, but I see nothing useful as to WHAT I have 
> wrong.
>
> Paul notes that two states elect electors by CD, which he calls 
> proportional, and wants all states to do this.
>      Given a state with 8 CDs, each voting 60 A and 40 B, he would 
> elect 10 A electors (remember the two senatorial).
>      Doing actual proportional, I would do 6 A and 4 B electors.  This 
> should more closely match the popular vote, plus allow possibility of 
> minor party electors (who could have promised how they would respond 
> once it was clear their nominee was not about to become President).
>
> Paul seems to offer nothing as to how his idea becomes salable to a 
> state such as NY, which now elects only Dem electors - while he wants 
> NY to do some Rep electors.
>
> Curt has a minor complaint about what Paul offers.
>
> Adam seems to dream of some magic that would make an amendment doable:
>      His magic is not convincing.
>      Needs clarification as to how 3/N and 54/M are even useful in 
> magic.
>
> Adam dreams that a near tie in a popular vote national election is not 
> worth preparing for:
>      There HAS to be a law somewhere that the bigger the problem 
> associated with not being prepared, the greater the odds of the event 
> happening.
>      Remember that near tie is not an absolute number, but based on 
> how big a change might result from a recount.
>
> On Wed, 28 Apr 2004 00:11:05 -0400 I wrote:
>
>> First I hit some serious topics; then I comment on some of what Curt 
>> & Adam wrote:
>>      Destroying the EC is neither practical nor useful.
>>      There are doable improvements for the EC.
>>      IRV people need to be locked out of this debate.
>> Practical nor useful?
>>      Not practical, for it requires at least some of the low 
>> population states to approve a Constitutional amendment that gives 
>> them less voice in electing a President.
>>      What lies down this path - electing by nationwide popular vote? 
>> Then you get nationwide suffering with near ties like Florida got in 
>> 2000 with a near tie.
>> Doable?
>>      Article II.2 authorizes each state Legislature to see to 
>> appointing electors.  It says almost NOTHING as to how they should go 
>> about this.
>>      Note that, per Amendment XII, the House (or Senate) DO NOT get 
>> to pick some stranger when they get to pick - they pick from the 
>> candidates getting the most EC votes.
>> So - what to do:
>>      NOTHING as to mechanics of doing the election.
>>      Appoint EC members proportionally in each state, per popular 
>> vote. Whoever nominates a slate of EC candidates produces an ordered 
>> list so that, should their candidate get half the vote, first half of 
>> their list gets appointed.
>>      It is EXPECTED that whoever nominates EC candidates will have 
>> them committed to reasonableness:
>>           Major party EC candidates likely promise to vote for their 
>> party's candidates.
>>           Other party EC candidates likely promise to vote for their 
>> party's candidates if there is a chance of winning; else whatever was 
>> agreed to when they became a candidate.
>> Actually doing:
>>      Swing states might do the above, since it does not give any 
>> special advantage to any party.
>>      States such as NY could not afford to give the Republicans the 
>> unfair advantage of getting some NY EC votes; NY could consider 
>> partnering with states that would give comparable aid to the 
>> Democrats.
>>      This thought is possible ammunition for a Constitutional 
>> amendment.
>> Lockout IRV?
>>      The above proportional election of EC members is better than any 
>> IRV dream I have heard of,
>> On Tue, 27 Apr 2004 17:32:23 -0700 Curt Siffert wrote per
>>     Subject :Re: [EM] electoral college/ two-party-duopoly
>>>
>>> On Apr 27, 2004, at 4:55 PM, Adam H Tarr wrote:
>>>
>>>> Curt wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> [ The first issue really illustrates what I find so impossible 
>>>>> about
>>>>> IRV advocates, because many of them advocate IRV *in presidential
>>>>> elections*, but *before* removing the EC.  Implementing IRV in 
>>>>> pres.
>>>>> elections on a state level, without changing the EC, has *no* 
>>>>> effect
>>>>> whatsoever,
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Not so.  It could swing an election from one major party to another 
>>>> in a
>>>> swing state, by transferring the votes of a wing party.  To take 
>>>> 2000 as
>>>> an easy example: give Gore the Nader votes, and he as a clear 
>>>> majority in
>>>> Florida.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I should have been more clear - Such an IRV scheme has no effect on
>>> making it more likely their candidate will win or that their 
>>> interests will
>>> be reflected.  They can't win the EC until they have 270 EVs, at 
>>> which
>>> point they're not exactly a third party anymore.
>>>
>>>> There is an argument that IRV perpetuates a two-party system almost 
>>>> as
>>>> well as plurality does.  That's a bad thing in general, but in the
>>>> isolated case of trying to avoid elections being sent to the House, 
>>>> it's a
>>>> good thing.
>>>
>>>
>> How is getting the House involved on near ties a crime?
>>>
>>> What pro-IRV argument makes sent-to-House elections less likely?
>>>
>>>> 1) Some small states actually get under-represented in the EC, due 
>>>> to
>>>> being just short of getting an extra representative.  So the EC is
>>>> actually pretty erratic in this regard.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Yes, apportionment is sort of arbitrary.  The ratio of 
>>> representatives to
>>> senators is arbitrary - the House scaled with population for a 
>>> while, then
>>> just turned the scaling off.
>> This puzzles.  The small state has to rate ONE extra House member to 
>> rate ONE extra EC member - still ahead of NY, etc.
>>>
>>>> 3) People tend to associate small states with rural populations and
>>>> certain interests, but the EC is a very crude tool at best if 
>>>> increasing
>>>> the representation of those interests.  And why should they get a 
>>>> larger
>>>> say, anyway?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> There are strong arguments on both sides of this question.  I 
>>> actually
>>> think less populated states should get a higher representation ratio
>>> for environmental reasons.  But yes, the EC's current implementation
>>> of this aim is crude and bad.
>>>
>>> If I were to overhaul it and still keep the EC, I'd award each 
>>> state's EVs
>>> proportionally according to the placement of each candidate in that
>>> state.  According to that scheme, by the way, Bush just barely won in
>>> 2000 (spoiled by Nader) - Gore actually won more of the ultra-close
>>> states in 2000.  I'd figure the placement of each candidate with a 
>>> better
>>> voting scheme.  (Thus my question about normalizing placement of
>>> multiple candidates on a 100-point scale a few threads ago.)  I'd
>>> re-apportion the EVs to more accurately reflect the population.  I'd 
>>> want
>>> some way to come up with a more thoughtful compromise/ratio between
>>> popular and regional representation (less arbitrary than 435:100).
>>>
>> I agree as to proportional.  Not clear how you can make a better 
>> voting scheme for this purpose.
>> BTW - the House has stumbled into 435 - they might decide that is too 
>> many for a legislative body without asking how it would affect the 
>> EC.
>>>> So, the EC should be abolished, but that's not news around here.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On the contrary, there are many Condorcet advocates that might not
>>> support the abolishment of the EC under all circumstances.  I think 
>>> it's
>>> superior to a nationwide popular (plurality) vote, for instance.
>>>
>>>>>  Sure, perhaps too stable, but I personally do find it a
>>>>> hard argument to make that a multiple-party legislative body is 
>>>>> clearly
>>>>> and incontrovertibly better than a two-party legislative body.  
>>>>> When I
>>>>> see the nature of some of the power-sharing alliance agreements in 
>>>>> some
>>>>> parliamentary bodies with many small parties, it doesn't seem to 
>>>>> do a
>>>>> much better job of democratically representing the population than 
>>>>> a
>>>>> two-party body (this reaches the outer limits of my study and I 
>>>>> don't
>>>>> have many examples to draw on; the only one I find myself thinking 
>>>>> of
>>>>> in this regard is Israel's).
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The unstable parliamentary democracies are the ones where the ruling
>>>> coalition needs to maintain a majority so that it can form a 
>>>> government.
>>>> Even if we had 50 parties in the house, there would still be no 
>>>> need for
>>>> this.  Sure, they'd have to think of new rules for forming 
>>>> committees and
>>>> such, but the executive branch is elected seperately in the USA, so 
>>>> all
>>>> those stability issues are not a problem.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> That is a good point, I will remember this one.  Our leader doesn't 
>>> by definition
>>> come from our ruling congressional party.
>>>
>>>> ...if you put more diverse opinions on the floor, that are more
>>>> representative of the people, then you give the people more choices 
>>>> about
>>>> how the government is run.  Right now, (to pick an example out of a 
>>>> hat)
>>>> voters can't easily elect a representative to congress who will 
>>>> oppose
>>>> affirmative action but support abortion rights.  If I have those 
>>>> opinions,
>>>> I'm probably going to end up voting for a candidate who will 
>>>> misrepresent
>>>> me on one of them.  More parties would solve many such connundrums.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I agree, but the point against such an arrangement is that it could 
>>> spur
>>> even greater gridlock within the legislative body.
>>>
>>>>> In short, is it not possible to simply reform the two-party duopoly
>>>>> rather than get rid of it entirely?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I really don't think so... as long as you have two parties, you
>>>> essentially force the voters to tie their decisions on every issue
>>>> together and cast one vote, even if they disagree with 49% of those
>>>> decisions.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> However, in a representative democracy, this is kind of the point.
>>> Part of my input has already been accounted for in earlier elections 
>>> -
>>> primaries and the like.  And so, my representative in DC isn't really
>>> expected to represent *me*, he's expected to represent the consensus
>>> of which I am a part.  I expect to not fit that mold exactly.
>>>
>>> Whereas in a legislative body of hundreds of representatives, one of
>>> whom might represent me exactly, they'd all be very different from 
>>> each
>>> other, and I wouldn't expect any of the body's results to be 
>>> everything
>>> that my representative wants.
>>>
>>> So I don't see how it's clearly better.  I see Condorcet as 
>>> inarguably better
>>> than Plurality and IRV, but I don't see multi-party representation 
>>> as inarguably
>>> better than a two-party "duopoly".
>>>
>> Something immediately above puzzles - most of this thread is about 
>> President and EC, which does not care much about how many parties.
>>     Electing House and Senate is where duopoly gets active, and where 
>> ranked ballots could do some good.
>>> - Curt
>
> -- 
>  davek at clarityconnect.com    people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
>  Dave Ketchum   108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708   607-687-5026
>            Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
>                  If you want peace, work for justice.
>
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