[EM] Strong FBC--This time it's personal! ; )

Alex Small asmall at physics.ucsb.edu
Sat Mar 13 11:01:46 PST 2004


James Green-Armytage said:
> "Alex Small" <asmall at physics.ucsb.edu> writes:
>> I will prove
>>that Approval Voting is superior to any ranked method if your goal is
>> to let voters defend their interests without betraying their favorite.
>
> 	That's not my goal, and I don't quite see why it seems to be so
> important
> to some of y'all. There are so many important properties for voting
> systems to have, why fetishize that one?

It's not necessarily my goal from a practical standpoint.  But I see it as
an interesting academic question.  The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem is
clearly an interesting result, and this is just a way to extend that
result a little further, to test the limits of sincere and insincere
voting.

Besides, some people, for whatever reason, do want a method that minimizes
incentives to vote insincerely.  You could take the message of my post as
"Well, if that's all you want, the best you can do is approval voting in
some sense, but that clearly results in a loss of expressivity.  So maybe
it's time to give up all hope of having a strategy-proof method."



Alex





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