[EM] Strong FBC--This time it's personal! ; )

[James Green-Armytage]

"Alex Small" <asmall at physics.ucsb.edu> writes:
> I will prove
>that Approval Voting is superior to any ranked method if your goal is to
>let voters defend their interests without betraying their favorite. 

	That's not my goal, and I don't quite see why it seems to be so important
to some of y'all. There are so many important properties for voting
systems to have, why fetishize that one? 
	For example, I think that the fact that approval doesn't meet majority /
mutual majority is much more important than the fact that it never gives
incentive for people to rank another candidate over their favorite. What
it does *all the time* is give incentive to rank a less favorite equal to
their favorite, or a third favorite equal to a fourth favorite, and so on.
Why is a ubiquitous incentive / need to compress rankings all rankings
into two positions less of a problem than an occasional incentive to
reverse particular rankings? Sorry, I just don't see it. Both involve a
significant distortion of voter preferences. 
	As for FBC, yes, I think that it is impossible as long as you require
that a method possess certain "obvious" properties like universal domain,
anonymity, nondictatorship, and whatever else. If there is a genuine
Condorcet cycle, then it will always be in the interest to collapse the
cycle towards one of their later preferences.

my best
James