[EM] Strong FBC--This time it's personal! ; )

Dave Ketchum davek at clarityconnect.com
Sat Mar 13 15:54:17 PST 2004


On Sat, 13 Mar 2004 09:30:00 -0800 (PST) Alex Small wrote:

> James Green-Armytage said:
> 
>>"Alex Small" <asmall at physics.ucsb.edu> writes:
>>
>>>I will prove
>>>that Approval Voting is superior to any ranked method if your goal is
>>>to let voters defend their interests without betraying their favorite.
>>>
>>	That's not my goal, and I don't quite see why it seems to be so
>>important
>>to some of y'all. There are so many important properties for voting
>>systems to have, why fetishize that one?
>>
> 
> It's not necessarily my goal from a practical standpoint.  But I see it as
> an interesting academic question.  The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem is
> clearly an interesting result, and this is just a way to extend that
> result a little further, to test the limits of sincere and insincere
> voting.
> 
> Besides, some people, for whatever reason, do want a method that minimizes
> incentives to vote insincerely.  You could take the message of my post as
> "Well, if that's all you want, the best you can do is approval voting in
> some sense, but that clearly results in a loss of expressivity.  So maybe
> it's time to give up all hope of having a strategy-proof method."
> 

As to betraying my favorite, I demand that there be no record associating 
my ballot with me.

Even without the required secrecy, my top priority is to be able to defend 
my interests - to be able to tell the counter:
      I WANT Tom.
      If that is not possible, I WANT Dick.
      I like Harry LESS than either Tom or Dick.

> 
> 
> Alex

-- 
  davek at clarityconnect.com    people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
  Dave Ketchum   108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708   607-687-5026
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