[EM] Strong FBC--This time it's personal! ; )
Dave Ketchum
davek at clarityconnect.com
Sat Mar 13 15:54:17 PST 2004
On Sat, 13 Mar 2004 09:30:00 -0800 (PST) Alex Small wrote:
> James Green-Armytage said:
>
>>"Alex Small" <asmall at physics.ucsb.edu> writes:
>>
>>>I will prove
>>>that Approval Voting is superior to any ranked method if your goal is
>>>to let voters defend their interests without betraying their favorite.
>>>
>> That's not my goal, and I don't quite see why it seems to be so
>>important
>>to some of y'all. There are so many important properties for voting
>>systems to have, why fetishize that one?
>>
>
> It's not necessarily my goal from a practical standpoint. But I see it as
> an interesting academic question. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem is
> clearly an interesting result, and this is just a way to extend that
> result a little further, to test the limits of sincere and insincere
> voting.
>
> Besides, some people, for whatever reason, do want a method that minimizes
> incentives to vote insincerely. You could take the message of my post as
> "Well, if that's all you want, the best you can do is approval voting in
> some sense, but that clearly results in a loss of expressivity. So maybe
> it's time to give up all hope of having a strategy-proof method."
>
As to betraying my favorite, I demand that there be no record associating
my ballot with me.
Even without the required secrecy, my top priority is to be able to defend
my interests - to be able to tell the counter:
I WANT Tom.
If that is not possible, I WANT Dick.
I like Harry LESS than either Tom or Dick.
>
>
> Alex
--
davek at clarityconnect.com people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026
Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
If you want peace, work for justice.
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