[EM] Minimally improving Approval

[Kevin Venzke]

Forest,

 --- Forest Simmons <fsimmons at pcc.edu> a écrit : > How about this:
> 
> A preliminary ranking of the candidates by approval scores is modified by
> correcting the single greatest "discrepancy" (if there is any) unless
> correcting this discrepancy would create another discrepancy of the same
> or greater magnitude.
> 
> A "discrepancy" is a pair of candidates who (according to a majority of
> ballots) is ranked in the wrong order.  Correction of a discrepancy is
> accomplished by swapping the positions of the two candidates involved.
> 
> The highest ranked candidate of the final ranking is the winner.

I wonder if you mean to say:

"Elect the least-approved candidate who pairwise beats every candidate with
greater approval"?

I like that method.  I do think it is an improvement over Approval.  But
it's hard enough to hand-count that I suppose a better method may as well
be used, unless this method is considered very intuitive.

I don't believe Steve Eppley's MAM method uses the notion of approval.
I think it tries to successively lock the strongest wins, like RP(wv).

Kevin Venzke
stepjak at yahoo.fr



	

	
		
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