[EM] Proposed method of cycle resolution

[Markus Schulze]

Dear Diana,

you wrote (23 Sep 2003):
> There's that problem if we're talking about candidates, yes.
> I _think_ if we're talking about multiple choice decisions on policies
> that question is significantly less likely to arise (and to be honest
> that is where the main focus of my attention is directed at the moment,
> as that's the problem for which I urgently need a solution).  I don't
> see it as possible that one would have multiple clone amendments (indeed
> I believe that there are provisions in the Statutes to stop such happening).

A violation of independence of clones is an even more serious problem when we
talk about referendums since it is significantly more simple to run a large
number of clone proposals than to run a large number of clone candidates:
http://www.topica.com/lists/RankedPairs/read/message.html?mid=1600682273

You wrote (23 Sep 2003):
> One of the reasons I like my methods is that, once one has got to the
> Smith set, adding a set of ballots in which A is strictly preferred to B
> can only help A rather than harming its chances, unlike most (all?) of
> the popular cycle resolution methods, which I think would be a good selling
> point for the electorate I'm trying to assist.

Condorcet and participation are incompatible. That means: No single-winner
election method can simultaneously satisfy Condorcet and participation.

Markus Schulze