[EM] Proposed method of cycle resolution

[Diana Galletly]

On Tue, 23 Sep 2003, Markus Schulze wrote:

> A violation of independence of clones is an even more serious problem when we
> talk about referendums since it is significantly more simple to run a large
> number of clone proposals than to run a large number of clone candidates:

As I said, I *believe* that it's not a problem in the particular
(highly-specialised) situation I'm trying to solve, in that ISTR
(and I'm ploughing through reams of paper and have asked others who
might remember better) that substantially-similar amendments will
get subsumed into a single amendment.  Certainly I've not seen a
ballot with clones on it; and I'm fairly sure they get filtered out
prior to a ballot being held.

> Condorcet and participation are incompatible. That means: No single-winner
> election method can simultaneously satisfy Condorcet and participation.

Yes, I'm aware of that.  What I think I'm after is a method whose edge-cases
are so far out as to be unlikely ever to happen in practice.

Otherwise I will have difficulty convincing people to agree to move from
the current (IRV) system.  (Unless and until I prove real-life inconsistencies
and problems from that of course).

Diana.