[EM] PR and Second Chambers

[Kevin Venzke]

James,

It seems to me that most of your rebuttals are quite
right if the single-winner method is FPTP.  I imagine
you haven't had much enthusiasm for more exotic
single-winner methods, but I depend on them for my
part, because I'm not interested in FPTP.  I should
clarify that I perceive a "good single-winner method"
to be one which picks the best compromise, doesn't
discourage lots of candidates from running, and
permits many/most blocs to influence the result.

 --- James Gilmour <jgilmour at globalnet.co.uk> a
écrit :
...
> representative of those who have
> voted.  If that elected body is not properly
> representative, then a 50%+1 majority
> of the legislators is likely to represent far less
> than 50%+1 of the voters.

True, but I personally think this is a better gamble
for the excluded blocs.  Policy can never drift very
far off-center.  (I am assuming every excluded bloc
has an opposite excluded bloc whom they dislike more
than the center.  I think that would tend to be true.)

> Irrespective of how decisions are made, it is
> important for representative
> democracy that all significant views are represented
> in the legislature.

I can agree with this, but I would prefer to implement
it in a weaker chamber.  That is, I think there are
more important principles than this.

> Minority
> views may be consistently voted down, but at least
> their voices will have been
> heard and their points of view will have been
> argued.  If they have no
> representation (elected members), those views will
> never be heard, much less
> argued.

I must define "minority views" much more broadly than
you do.  Under PR (or FPTP), I would say that
"minority views" are implemented much more often than
they should be.

I suppose you would be unhappy if all had
representation in the legislature, but not all were
permitted to vote.  That is, the election resolution
math could determine, in some simple fashion, which
blocs are so controversial that they should not be
permitted into a governing majority.

> 
> The second issue is how the legislature makes its
> decisions.  I fully agree that
> when the chips are down, the best you can guarantee
> is 50%+1 of the legislators.
> But an assembly elected by PR is likely to have a
> very different make-up from one
> elected by any single-winner method.  Single-party
> majority government is less
> likely.  And of course, if the legislature is mature
> enough to run well with a
> minority executive, then every majority vote will be
> a consensus result.

I don't want single-party majority government, either.
  But I think PR combined with a parliamentary model
will produce single-party majorities far too often. 
For people to feel free to vote their true
preferences, the executive should not be at stake. 
"Who picks the executive" is a different tricky issue,
I guess.

> It is wrong to exclude "extremes" that have
> significant support among the voters.
> It is only the size of the support that should
> determine representation.  To
> exclude "extreme" views that have significant
> support will undermine
> representative democracy and lead to much less
> desirable direct action.

My perspective is that the "extremes" should play
tug-of-war with each other in the election.  A good
single-winner method would permit a larger extreme to
"pull closer" the location of the center.

> > The
> > reason to preclude them is that it would be
> > undesirable for them to participate in a
> legislative
> > majority if other, more centrist segments are
> omitted
> > from it.
> 
> There is no reason why proportionate representation
> of "extremes" should reduce
> the proportionate representation of centrist
> segments.

If the centrist segments all preferred to align with
each other, and with no extremes, then I would be
content.  But if "extremes" (and again, I am more
broad with that term) are able to form a majority with
only certain centrist segments, I am discontent that
the resulting policies may be unnecessarily distant
from the center.

> > The aim of this (centering) is to reduce the
> > maximum amount of discontent felt by any segment
> of
> > the voters.
> 
> Experience suggest the opposite is more likely. 
> Rigging the voting system to
> exclude the "extremes" will probably create
> discontent greatly in excess of the
> size of those extremes.  Direct action of a
> non-parliamentary kind may follow - as
> many examples around the world sadly testify.

If we are talking about FPTP, I think you are right.

> > Maybe you will say that whichever majority can
> > assemble itself should receive the power, but I
> think
> > that would be inconsistent with your desire to
> have
> > everyone represented.
> 
> I see nothing inconsistent with my views in the
> suggestion that whichever majority
> can assemble itself should receive the power.  If
> you can persuade an absolute
> majority of your fellow electors to vote for your
> favoured candidates and thus
> gain majority representation in the elected
> legislature, I should want the party
> you supported to form the executive.

This sounds eerily like it could be made a defense of
FPTP.

> Similarly, if
> after the election, no one
> party has a majority in the legislature (and
> minority government is not the
> favoured option) I should expect whatever coalition
> could secure majority support
> from the legislators to form the executive.  
>These approaches are completely
> consistent with a demand that all significant points
> of view are represented in
> the elected legislature.

I think you are right, in that you make a point to
differentiate "representation in the legislature" with
"representation by the resulting policies," so to
speak.  My sentiment is that a good single-winner
method (not FPTP) could outperform PR in the latter
quality.

...
>  It should be the proportion of
> the voters they can persuade
> to support them that should determine their
> representation, not their place on the
> political spectrum.

Alright, I see what you meant (on the "extremist"
subject).  I'd thought you were denying the existence
of a spectrum in any sense.

>  We never solve political
> problems by denying representation
> to those with significant support for their
> political views.

Insofar as "representation" refers specifically to
legislative seats occupied by one's first-choice
candidates, I think this assertion would be quite
difficult to defend.  It depends upon the meaning of
"significant support," I suppose.


Kevin Venzke
stepjak at yahoo.fr


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