[EM] PR and Second Chambers

[James Gilmour]

Kevin wrote:
> James,
> It seems to me that most of your rebuttals are quite
> right if the single-winner method is FPTP.

Not just FPTP.  I would suggest that a legislative assembly elected by STV-PR
would be preferable to ALL single-winner methods without exception.

>  I imagine
> you haven't had much enthusiasm for more exotic
> single-winner methods, but I depend on them for my
> part, because I'm not interested in FPTP.

I detest FPTP.  I would accept IRV or Condorcet as improvements over FPTP, but
neither IRV nor Condorcet nor any other single-winner can address the real problem
when you are elected the members of a legislative assembly rather than filling a
single-person office.

> I should
> clarify that I perceive a "good single-winner method"
> to be one which picks the best compromise, doesn't
> discourage lots of candidates from running, and
> permits many/most blocs to influence the result.

I am happy to accept this as a qualitative definition.

>  --- James Gilmour a écrit :
> ...
> > representative of those who have
> > voted.  If that elected body is not properly
> > representative, then a 50%+1 majority
> > of the legislators is likely to represent far less
> > than 50%+1 of the voters.
>
> True, but I personally think this is a better gamble
> for the excluded blocs.

I do not believe in gambles.  An election should not be a game of chance.  We have
seen too much of that in the UK for far too long.  If voters who share your views
comprise 20% of the total who vote, you and they should have 20% (more or less) of
the seats in the elected assembly.

>  Policy can never drift very
> far off-center.  (I am assuming every excluded bloc
> has an opposite excluded bloc whom they dislike more
> than the center.  I think that would tend to be true.)

Your assertion MAY be correct (but I have my doubts).  However, the most serious
point remains.  You have manipulated the voting system to deny significant groups
any direct representation.  That may be what YOU want, but it is not
representative democracy.  Just wait until you find yourself in one of those
"extreme" excluded blocks!


> > Irrespective of how decisions are made, it is
> > important for representative
> > democracy that all significant views are represented
> > in the legislature.
>
> I can agree with this, but I would prefer to implement
> it in a weaker chamber.

Why?  Surely it is most important in the strongest chamber, ie the one with the
real power to make decisions.

> That is, I think there are
> more important principles than this.

If you live in what is supposed to be a representative democracy I cannot think of
a more important principle than that the elected assembly be properly
representative of those who vote for its members.

> > Minority
> > views may be consistently voted down, but at least
> > their voices will have been
> > heard and their points of view will have been
> > argued.  If they have no
> > representation (elected members), those views will
> > never be heard, much less
> > argued.
>
> I must define "minority views" much more broadly than
> you do.  Under PR (or FPTP), I would say that
> "minority views" are implemented much more often than
> they should be.

Minorities may be large or small.  With FPTP, minority views are implemented much
more often than they should be, but not for the reason I think you had in mind.
The UK has had 16 elections since 1945.  All but one has produced a single-party
majority government.  But every one of those governments has had only minority
support of the voters (the lowest was 39%).  So we have had 50 years of continuous
minority rule.  At least with PR you could be sure that the views implemented were
those of a majority of the voters.

> I suppose you would be unhappy if all had
> representation in the legislature, but not all were
> permitted to vote.

Yes, I should be extremely unhappy if this were possible.  I cannot see any
purpose whatsoever in electing representatives to a legislative assembly and then
denying them a vote in that assembly.

> That is, the election resolution
> math could determine, in some simple fashion, which
> blocs are so controversial that they should not be
> permitted into a governing majority.

You are on very dangerous ground here.  It is not for you or me or anyone else to
decide who is so controversial that they should not be permitted into a governing
majority.  Of course, some voting systems are more sensitive than others in the
messages they can send to the elected members, to the political parties and to the
assembly.  For example, if a (large) minority centre party is likely to have the
options of forming a majority coalition either with a party to its right or with a
party to its left, the supporters (voters) of that centre party can indicate which
way they would prefer it to go by expressing their preferences for its candidates
who favour coalition with the right or with the left.  For that you would need
STV-PR.  No other PR system is so sensitive, ie gives the voters such power.  And,
of course, this is impossible with any single-winner system.

> > The second issue is how the legislature makes its
> > decisions.  I fully agree that
> > when the chips are down, the best you can guarantee
> > is 50%+1 of the legislators.
> > But an assembly elected by PR is likely to have a
> > very different make-up from one
> > elected by any single-winner method.  Single-party
> > majority government is less
> > likely.  And of course, if the legislature is mature
> > enough to run well with a
> > minority executive, then every majority vote will be
> > a consensus result.
>
> I don't want single-party majority government, either.
>   But I think PR combined with a parliamentary model
> will produce single-party majorities far too often.

I think the world evidence is to the contrary.  Certainly the UK opponents of PR
always point to the absence of  (manufactured) single-party overall majority as
one of the "defects" of PR.  Had the UK had a sensible implementation of almost
any PR system we would have had probably only two (possibly five) single-party
majority governments in the past 50 years.  If we had had a single national list
party list PR system, we should not have had any single-party majority governments
in all that time.

> For people to feel free to vote their true
> preferences, the executive should not be at stake.

If the executive is formed from within the elected legislature, the executive will
always be at stake in elections to that assembly.

> "Who picks the executive" is a different tricky issue,
> I guess.

That does depend on the political model and political convention, which varies
from culture to culture.

> > It is wrong to exclude "extremes" that have
> > significant support among the voters.
> > It is only the size of the support that should
> > determine representation.  To
> > exclude "extreme" views that have significant
> > support will undermine
> > representative democracy and lead to much less
> > desirable direct action.
>
> My perspective is that the "extremes" should play
> tug-of-war with each other in the election.  A good
> single-winner method would permit a larger extreme to
> "pull closer" the location of the center.

Maybe, but direct representation of all significant views will always be better -
that is if you really do want representative democracy.

> > > The
> > > reason to preclude them is that it would be
> > > undesirable for them to participate in a
> > legislative
> > > majority if other, more centrist segments are
> > omitted
> > > from it.
> >
> > There is no reason why proportionate representation
> > of "extremes" should reduce
> > the proportionate representation of centrist
> > segments.
>
> If the centrist segments all preferred to align with
> each other, and with no extremes, then I would be
> content.  But if "extremes" (and again, I am more
> broad with that term) are able to form a majority with
> only certain centrist segments, I am discontent that
> the resulting policies may be unnecessarily distant
> from the center.

There are really two separate issues here - the relative sizes of the elected
groups and their respective positions along the political spectrum. Where a
majority government is normal, you might expect the initiative to be taken by the
largest group.  But the largest group may be at one end of the political spectrum
and other parties may be reluctant to form coalitions with them.  (That has
happened in Italy where the Communist Party has frequently won 30% of the votes
and 30% of the seats.)

> > > The aim of this (centering) is to reduce the
> > > maximum amount of discontent felt by any segment
> > of
> > > the voters.
> >
> > Experience suggest the opposite is more likely.
> > Rigging the voting system to
> > exclude the "extremes" will probably create
> > discontent greatly in excess of the
> > size of those extremes.  Direct action of a
> > non-parliamentary kind may follow - as
> > many examples around the world sadly testify.
>
> If we are talking about FPTP, I think you are right.

I would say it would apply to all voting systems that had the effect of denying
representation to groups with significant support, especially if the voting system
were manipulated deliberately to this end.

> > > Maybe you will say that whichever majority can
> > > assemble itself should receive the power, but I
> > think
> > > that would be inconsistent with your desire to
> > have
> > > everyone represented.
> >
> > I see nothing inconsistent with my views in the
> > suggestion that whichever majority
> > can assemble itself should receive the power.  If
> > you can persuade an absolute
> > majority of your fellow electors to vote for your
> > favoured candidates and thus
> > gain majority representation in the elected
> > legislature, I should want the party
> > you supported to form the executive.
>
> This sounds eerily like it could be made a defense of
> FPTP.

I don't see how.  My comments were made in the context of PR elections.  If one
party then wins a majority of the seats, it does so because it has the support of
a majority of those who voted.

> > Similarly, if
> > after the election, no one
> > party has a majority in the legislature (and
> > minority government is not the
> > favoured option) I should expect whatever coalition
> > could secure majority support
> > from the legislators to form the executive.
> >These approaches are completely
> > consistent with a demand that all significant points
> > of view are represented in
> > the elected legislature.
>
> I think you are right, in that you make a point to
> differentiate "representation in the legislature" with
> "representation by the resulting policies," so to
> speak.  My sentiment is that a good single-winner
> method (not FPTP) could outperform PR in the latter
> quality.

I cannot see how you can have better "representation by the resulting policies" if
you start with poorer representation by the elected members in the legislature.

> >  It should be the proportion of
> > the voters they can persuade
> > to support them that should determine their
> > representation, not their place on the
> > political spectrum.
>
> Alright, I see what you meant (on the "extremist"
> subject).  I'd thought you were denying the existence
> of a spectrum in any sense.
>
> >  We never solve political
> > problems by denying representation
> > to those with significant support for their
> > political views.
>
> Insofar as "representation" refers specifically to
> legislative seats occupied by one's first-choice
> candidates, I think this assertion would be quite
> difficult to defend.

I don't think it is difficult to defend at all. We can see examples around the
world (some very close to home) where serious extra-parliamentary activity has
become the order of the day because groups with significant support have been
denied representation.  (It does not affect this issue, but my view of
"representation" is not defined solely by first-choice candidates.)

>  It depends upon the meaning of
> "significant support," I suppose.

Yes, size does matter.  But as I said in another post to this list, I would never
advocate electing all 659 members of the UK House of Commons from a single
district.  Representation should NOT be given to a group that can muster only one
1/659th of the total vote.  The political downside can be seen in Israel where
seats are allocated to parties down to one in 120 by closed national party list.
That is the world's worst implementation of the world's worst system of PR.  The
political fallout is horrendous.

James