[EM] PR and Second Chambers

[Craig Carey]

At 03\03\25 09:27 +0000 Tuesday, James Gilmour wrote:
>I had written
>> > I do appreciate the sophistication that can go into
>> > gerrymandering.  However, the
>> > fundamental problem remains that 50% of those who
>> > vote will get no representation
>> > no matter whether the district is gerrymandered or
>> > not.
>
>Kevin replied
>> I think this is a weird criticism.  No matter how many
>> people can be represented under PR, no more than 50%+1
>> of the legislators are guaranteed to be represented by
>> the policies passed, or by the installed prime
>> minister and cabinet.  (Maybe your sentiment is that
>> having seats is all that matters for representation?
>> I might agree, so then bicameral would be best.)
>
>Mine is not at all a weird criticism.  There are two quite different
>issues here. The first, and the more fundamental, is to ensure that the
>elected assembly (parliament, council, whatever) is properly
>representative of those who have voted.  If that elected body is not
>properly representative, then a 50%+1 majority of the legislators is
>likely to represent far less than 50%+1 of the voters.
>

The majority principle can be rejected outright.
It could nip back when implied by some other principle. If that happens
then there is some hope that it is not so apparently unconvincing.

With this 1 winner 3 candidate election, monotonicity led to both A
and B losing. It seems to be an implausible weak claim to say that A and
B really do have a majority.

3(AB)
3(BA)
4(C)


The ill-formed (easily disputed dubious) majority ideal (e.g. Dummett's
rule saying that one of A or B should win) is inconsistent with the
"First Preference Loser" idea saying that

  if X loses with the 1st preference then it loses no matter what is
  written onto the same ballot paper.

That is a mix of a truncation resistance and monotoncity over the
1st preference.

Likely no one will say that FPL can be satisfied with C also losing.

So transferring the idea 'majority is unimportant' out, can lead to
60% quotas before a bill passes, and whatever.



...
>parties" should be excluded from the elected legislature.  I don't agree
>- with the one proviso - that they have significant support.  It should
>be the proportion of the voters they can persuade to support them that
>should determine their representation, not their place on the political
>spectrum.  We never solve political problems by denying representation
>to those with significant support for their political views.
>


It may be better to say that local information is needed before the
principle can be stable.

That view that minorities should have power could malfunction if ported
into preferential voting theory. It could go either of these two ways:

(1) they have got the power but as a mere detail the minority can't figure
   out how to vote for the wrong people so that the power can be actually
   wielded.

(2) the converse.

The fix seems to be to stop the negating of votes (get a pass under a
monotonicity test). But that rule allows minorities to have absolutely
no influence whatsoever. Monotonicity just stops negating.

It might be better to copy the mathematical view and divide up the ideal
guaranteeing power into a strict part and an aim.

As before the problem can be solved for inside of the topic of preferential
voting and the ideal can transported to the simpler scenario of votes in
a house of parliament when there are 2 subtotals and <10% of the country
represented by a party.

Certainly a case exists for saying that minorities need two types of
rights instead of just 1, before they can get a guarantee of being
represented.

Suppose minorities should be deprived of risk and circumstances where
they can validly complain. Minorities could be satisfied with the
legal-mindedness of the leaders who gave them a right to complain, and
satisfied again with not actually having a basis for complaining.

A problem is that in addition to have no perfectly reasonable basis for
complaining about the election system, they can also have no influence
or vote. I.e. they got their equal suffrage rights.

In mathematics it can take 2 separate axioms before minorities are
assured of having an effective say.

Something that is maybe dissimilar is how a very fair method, i.e. one
that propagates ties between candidates in a way satisfying equal suffrage,
can also be biased. E.g. it was not FPTP that specified the boundary
values of the shadows, but, say, some rule that ensured that some
lower class party was disadvantaged. There too is a divide like between
strict rules and aims. Here the not strict rule is designing the method
around a biased embedded method that took account of the names of the
candidates/parties.

Mathematically the strict rules create something like the complex interior
of a cathedral, and to get the remaining unsolved centre of the polytope
filled in using yet more strict rules would easily result in a carpentry
disaster when far too few of the surfaces butressed in properly (with
the number of dimensions being over 200). The theory is that the problem
is perfectly absent if proportionality is added.

Taking the idea outside of preferential voting, it seems that one of the
ideas protecting minorities is legal in nature and it is too ready to
permit no say or power.

To say that minorities are entitled to representation is to have a
comment that could be clarified so that it is clear whether they must
have protection under 2 ideas, or just under 1.

----------

If it takes two principles and the claim is that the whole minority
deserves rights, then maybe it is only getting one right. Cats and
dogs in houses don't necessarily get a good deal when protected with
legal rights but lacking rights considering their welfare. In New
Zealand, an emerging law that is starting slowly but seemingly here,
specifies a welfare right to dogs allowing them to have an interesting
view from their kennel by the house. Welfare rights do not correspond
to monotonicity which permits no success whatsoever in getting what
they wanted. There is nothing else but proportionality to cater for
the hopes of minority parties that want more than a right to never
win in a just judicial forum.

They may want a right to have an effective say.



-------


At 03\03\24 12:06 +0000 Monday, James Gilmour wrote:
>Rob reported
>> According to the Warsaw Business Journal, there's a proposal on the
>> table to move away from proportional representation, and toward single
>> member districts elected by first-past-the-post. The article cites the
>> difficulty in reaching consensus under the current system (which isn't
>> surprising if they are relying on standard majoritarian rule amongst the
>> elected representatives).
>> Article is posted here:
>> http://www.wbj.pl/user/article.asp?ArticleID=174929
>> Also posted to Electorama!:
>> http://electorama.com/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=
>> 18&newlang=eng
>
>They are not the first post-communist country to propose this change or to make
>this change and I don't expect they will be the last.  However, they may find the
>change is a jump from the frying pan into the fire. 


_________________________________________________________________________


I note that dual polytopes (with a "<=0" instead of a "<=1") are a best way to
derive the 2 candidate 1 winner preferential voting method. Soc choice should
not be getting Nobel prizes whilst unaware or else there is something wrong
with the prizes. I presume the latter is the option to leap at (confirmable
by e-mailing the committee which I don't wish to try). Mr Buchanan got a Nobel
Prize in 1983.



PS. Mr Jan Kok had a dud e-mail address over maybe 2 weeks or more.