[EM] A strategy free method
Forest Simmons
fsimmons at pcc.edu
Fri Mar 21 10:20:36 PST 2003
You're right, but like approval it does satisfy the FBC.
For example, suppose that you think some candidate that you prefer to the
incumbent is more popular than your favorite. Then you might approve
favorite but not the popular compromise.
Forest
On Fri, 21 Mar 2003, Alex Small wrote:
> Let's see, this method is non-dictatorial, because all voters are equal.
> It's Pareto efficient, because if every single voter prefers the status
> quo to a certain candidate then that other guy can't win, and if every
> voter prefers a newcomer to the status quo then status quo can't win.
>
> Are you sure it's strategy-free?
>
>
> Forest Simmons said:
> > Here's a strategy free method that will work in certain situations:
> >
> > The main requirement is that there has to be an incumbent or status
> > quo option.
> >
> > The voters indicate which candidates they prefer over the status quo.
> > If the status quo is the Condorcet Winner (i.e. no alternative is
> > preferred over the status quo) then the incumbent/status quo stays in
> > for another term of office. Otherwise, the candidate that is
> > preferred over the status quo by the greatest number of voters is
> > elected.
> >
> > Basically, this is Approval, with the Minimum Acceptable Virtual
> > Candidate (aka the None of the Below approval cutoff) replaced by the
> > incumbent.
> >
> > You might say that pitting the incumbent against all comers is unfair
> > to the incumbent. In fact neutrality is violated.
> >
> > But this may be an appropriate balance on the inherent advantage of
> > incumbents who tend to use their political clout to set things up in
> > their favor.
> >
> > [Of course, it could backfire by encouraging even more of that sort of
> > thing.]
> >
> > Note that in a three way cycle of preference where majorities prefer A
> > to B to C to A, if those preferences persisted over time, the winners
> > would cycle from one election to another, yielding a form of temporal
> > PR.
> >
> > Forest
> >
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>
>
>
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