[EM] A strategy free method

Alex Small asmall at physics.ucsb.edu
Fri Mar 21 08:55:11 PST 2003


Let's see, this method is non-dictatorial, because all voters are equal. 
It's Pareto efficient, because if every single voter prefers the status
quo to a certain candidate then that other guy can't win, and if every
voter prefers a newcomer to the status quo then status quo can't win.

Are you sure it's strategy-free?


Forest Simmons said:
> Here's a strategy free method that will work in certain situations:
>
> The main requirement is that there has to be an incumbent or status
> quo option.
>
> The voters indicate which candidates they prefer over the status quo.
> If the status quo is the Condorcet Winner (i.e. no alternative is
> preferred over the status quo) then the incumbent/status quo stays in
> for another term of office.  Otherwise, the candidate that is
> preferred over the status quo by the greatest number of voters is
> elected.
>
> Basically, this is Approval, with the Minimum Acceptable Virtual
> Candidate (aka the None of the Below approval cutoff) replaced by the
> incumbent.
>
> You might say that pitting the incumbent against all comers is unfair
> to the incumbent.  In fact neutrality is violated.
>
> But this may be an appropriate balance on the inherent advantage of
> incumbents who tend to use their political clout to set things up in
> their favor.
>
> [Of course, it could backfire by encouraging even more of that sort of
> thing.]
>
> Note that in a three way cycle of preference where majorities prefer A
> to B to C to A, if those preferences persisted over time, the winners
> would cycle from one election to another, yielding a form of temporal
> PR.
>
> Forest
>
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