[EM] A strategy free method

Forest Simmons fsimmons at pcc.edu
Fri Mar 21 08:19:31 PST 2003


Here's a strategy free method that will work in certain situations:

The main requirement is that there has to be an incumbent or status quo
option.

The voters indicate which candidates they prefer over the status quo.  If
the status quo is the Condorcet Winner (i.e. no alternative is preferred
over the status quo) then the incumbent/status quo stays in for another
term of office.  Otherwise, the candidate that is preferred over the
status quo by the greatest number of voters is elected.

Basically, this is Approval, with the Minimum Acceptable Virtual Candidate
(aka the None of the Below approval cutoff) replaced by the incumbent.

You might say that pitting the incumbent against all comers is unfair to
the incumbent.  In fact neutrality is violated.

But this may be an appropriate balance on the inherent advantage of
incumbents who tend to use their political clout to set things up in their
favor.

[Of course, it could backfire by encouraging even more of that sort of
thing.]

Note that in a three way cycle of preference where majorities prefer A to
B to C to A, if those preferences persisted over time, the winners would
cycle from one election to another, yielding a form of temporal PR.

Forest




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