[EM] MinMax variant
Markus Schulze
markus.schulze at alumni.tu-berlin.de
Fri Mar 7 17:55:01 PST 2003
Dear Steve,
you wrote (7 March 2003):
> Minimax(pairwise opposition) even satisfies a criterion promoted by
> some advocates of Instant Runoff, which I call "Uncompromising":
>
> Let w denote the winning alternative given some set
> of ballots. If one or more ballots that had only w
> higher than bottom are changed so some other
> "compromise" alternative x is raised to second
> place (still below w but raised over all the other
> alternatives) then w must still win.
>
> The proof that Minimax(pairwise opposition) satisfies Uncompromising
> is simple: Raising x increases the pairwise opposition for all
> candidates except w and x, and does not decrease the pairwise
> opposition for any candidate, so w must still have the smallest
> maximum pairwise opposition.
>
> That criterion can be strengthened somewhat and still be satisfied:
> Changing pairwise indifferences to strict preferences in ballots that
> ranked w top cannot increase w's pairwise opposition or decrease any
> other alternatives' pairwise opposition.
That sounds like Woodall's later-no-harm + later-no-help.
(Douglas R. Woodall, "Monotonicity of single-seat preferential election
rules," Discrete Applied Mathematics, vol. 77, pp. 81-98, 1997.)
In another paper, Woodall proves that no election method can
simultaneously meet later-no-harm, later-no-help, monotonicity,
and mutual majority. Therefore, the fact that Minimax(pairwise
opposition) violates mutual majority in such a drastic manner
can be considered a consequence of the fact that it meets
later-no-harm, later-no-help, and monotonicity.
Example:
20 ABCD
20 BCAD
20 CABD
13 DABC
13 DBCA
13 DCAB
You wrote (7 March 2003):
> That's why I think the best method is a variation of Ranked Pairs
> which I call Maximize Affirmed Majorities, or MAM.
In so far as you have always considered Mike Ossipoff to be
authoritative, I would like to know what you think about the
fact that he doesn't promote Ranked Pairs anymore at his
web pages.
Markus Schulze
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