[EM] serious strategy problem in Condorcet, but not in IRV?
James Green-Armytage
jarmyta at antioch-college.edu
Tue Aug 19 10:50:06 PDT 2003
I wrote:
> In this particular example, what would
>>worry him (I think) is that A and B voters will both try to get a bury
>>each other, and will inadvertently elect C as a result, which I agree
>>would be a public disaster.
Eric wrote:
>
>But, would this really be *the* disaster or just another symptom of
>something that has already gone horribly wrong?
Reading this made me think that if Condorcet was implemented on a big
scale, and a situation like this arose in which the C candidate did
actually win, and a bunch of people blamed Condorcet, I think that it
might be justified for advocates of the system to say "it's not
Condorcet's fault, it's all of your fault for using such a violent and
risky strategy, you dummies."
The A voters might answer, "hey, its not our fault, we were just trying to
defend the rightful winner by deterring the B voters from their violent
strategy." I guess you could pin the blame on any voters who went in for
offensive order-reversal / burying, though (the B voters in my example)...
James
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