Questions for Eric G: sincerity (was Re: [EM] serious strategy problem ...

[Craig Carey]

At 2003-08-19 12:50 -0400 Tuesday, Eric Gorr wrote:
>At 12:31 PM -0400 8/19/03, James Green-Armytage wrote:
>>I agree that it is a very serious problem to force voters to make this
>>kind of compromising choices on a regular basis, as plurality clearly
>>does. But what M[...] is concerned with is more so the "burying" strategy,
...
>The only rational choice a rational voter can therefore make is to 
>put into place a method which can find the correct winner, based on 
>sincere votes, and to vote sincerely.


That is expansive:

* Mr Gorr writes on the correct winner. Please inform about the axioms
   that make a 3 candidate 2 winner be perfect.

* Sincerity does not exist.  I ask you to post up for me any data you
   have on the sincerity numbers for a real election, e.g. an election
   between "procedure eg()" subroutines in a multitasking voting
   computer program. Obviously I am asking about nothing important if
   asking about real elections.

* When replying to my e-mail here, please keep your insincerity (or
  lack of earnestness) about your own topic of sincerity well under a
   10**(-200) level and 

* A sincere method is something that competent theorist neither seek
  nor require but instead get, due to how the idea correlates with
  axioms that would be used. If you had of written down your axioms
  instead of explaining that it is now or never for real voters
  (without an ultimatum be provided) then it may have been that an
  axiom prevented the problem that you tried to suggest existed.

* However anybody who writes about certifying preferential methods by
  writing 100% Ossipoffisms, is probably a EM members who is takes pride
  in the joy of sending worthless ideas to the Election Methods List.

* A rational voter could easily stop at rejecting your ideas that are
  based upon a presumption that badness is the effect of not removing
  their privacy rights. They could be lined up and persusaded to start
  conceding that you were in fact correct in making their their
  rational reasonings so crucial that is missing entirely from the
  paragraph. Mike was doing research into these sorts of areas but
  then he said he stopped doing research into voting.

* An optimal method is easily a method you would pronounce to be
  unacceptably insincere. The papers can be improved. Why did you not
  say how the ballot papers would be redesigned.

  How you say that voters must vote sincerely.  That means that no 3
  vote election in a house, between a boy and 2 puppy dogs, can ever
  use a good method your might like by 2006, if the some serious
  development demonstrating insincerity occurs during the testing occurs
  if your text and the future clarifications are followed.

* Can you give a date at which the sincerity of IRV will present itself
  to your mind?. Or is it that you are leading a large breakaway
  here at EM into the new social science of assessing the rationality
  of random number subroutines and so on.

 * The agency calling for the vote is the agency that owns the voice of
  all the ballot papers. Two other things are: (1) matters about
  the voters (if any), and (2) the counts and preference lists. Your
  ideas are clearly having the agency running the vote be out of the
  Gorr-voters circle where sincerity is considered in such great
  detail that rationality numbers can be computed for each individual.

Where are the sincerity numbers ?. It might look this

   (A: 3.0, B: 2.0, C: -0.2, ...)*10**30.


The physical units can be the number of brain cells they have implementing
their own rationality divided by Mr Gorr's in the topic of preferential
voting. Since voting is a topic where the principles are partially quite
easy.

---

Eric is running a coverup over the fact that there is no sincerity
equation. Having such an axiom can be wrong, so there must be a EM-based
need for a coverup on why all other axioms are not there for us to read.
If they are there then a quick check would be done too see if they keep
the power inside the range, 0 to 1, since (unpexectedly) Mr Gorr hints
it might be better to get the winner right.

If Eric wants something then that can be made an axiom. For example, there
could be a set of axioms requiring that no more than 5% of the voters lose
their previously held influence when a preference for a complete loser is
inserted before the winner(s) that would change into a winner and thereby
raise that percentage statistic.

If voters would get rational then maybe they would be perceived by you
to be know what equation provides the sincerity is seemingly wanted by
you. If you ask them and then e-mail the equation out to me, it really
would not help for there is still the whole topic of the consistency of
your axioms. E.g. your hope of sincerity may contradict monotonicity.




Craig Carey
Single Transferable Vote: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/single-transferable-vote