[EM] serious strategy problem in Condorcet, but not in IRV?

[Eric Gorr]

At 12:31 PM -0400 8/19/03, James Green-Armytage wrote:
>I agree that it is a very serious problem to force voters to make this
>kind of compromising choices on a regular basis, as plurality clearly
>does. But what Monroe is concerned with is more so the "burying" strategy,
>and its possible consequences. In this particular example, what would
>worry him (I think) is that A and B voters will both try to get a bury
>each other, and will inadvertently elect C as a result, which I agree
>would be a public disaster.

But, would this really be *the* disaster or just another symptom of 
something that has already gone horribly wrong?

Still seems to me that it can only be a just another symptom of 
something that has already gone horribly wrong - as the vast majority 
no longer have an interest in finding the legitimate winner, but are 
now only interested in finding how they can manipulate the voting 
method to cause their candidate to win.

However, the sole reason for hope is that these manipulations can far 
to easily backfire causing either the most hated candidate to win 
(i.e. C in the case described) or your primary opponent (A or B) to 
win.

There has been some concern about polls...however, it seems to me 
this concern has been exaggerated. Why? Well, what would become a 
natural part of such manipulations would be not providing accurate 
information to the poll takers either...manipulating the polls would 
simply be part one of manipulating the voting method.

The only way to be certain is with near-perfect information on how 
people will vote and obtaining such information is darn near 
impossible and would almost certainly involve criminal activity.

The only rational choice a rational voter can therefore make is to 
put into place a method which can find the correct winner, based on 
sincere votes, and to vote sincerely.