[EM] IRV vs. plurality

[Eric Gorr]

At 6:33 PM +0200 8/6/03, Kevin Venzke wrote:
>David,
>
>  --- Dgamble997 at aol.com a écrit : >
>>  Eric Gorr wrote:
>>>  For example, why is it the right thing for A to win in this case:
>>>     40 A
>>>     35 C > B
>>>     30 B
>
>>  The example given by Eric is not that realistic ( it is not likely you would
>>  see such a vote set in a real election)
>
>If indeed this example is not realistic, it's because C decided
>not to run lest he spoil the election and throw it to A.

Is it really not realistic?

It seems to me that it can easily be generated in 
genuine elections when there are three or more 
parties capable of getting first place votes.

>This incentive (for C to not run, and B voters to not vote for C) is the first
>reason why I find IRV unacceptable.

There is also an incentive for the C voters to 
vote insincerely and rank B first since they may 
know their candidate cannot win.

>  > and in the normal course of discussion I would probably counter
>>  it with my favourite 49 A>B>C, 3 B>A>C, 48 C>B>A example with
>>  some comment about the importance of first preference
>>  votes/utility,
>
>But evidently you find such a scenario as unlikely as the
>Condorcet supporters do.

But, I really don't understand this scenario, assuming voters voted sincerely.

It is clear that the unambiguous winner is B. 
This is very different from the example above, 
where B should be the winner, but A won the 
election.