[EM] IRV vs. plurality

[Kevin Venzke]

David,

 --- Dgamble997 at aol.com a écrit : >
> Eric Gorr wrote:
>> For example, why is it the right thing for A to win in this case:
>>    40 A
>>    35 C > B
>>    30 B

> The example given by Eric is not that realistic ( it is not likely you would 
> see such a vote set in a real election)  

If indeed this example is not realistic, it's because C decided not to run lest
he spoil the election and throw it to A.

This incentive (for C to not run, and B voters to not vote for C) is the first
reason why I find IRV unacceptable.

>and in the normal course of 
> discussion I would probably counter it with my favourite 49 A>B>C, 3 B>A>C, 48 C>B>A 
> example with some comment about the importance of first preference 
> votes/utility, 

But evidently you find such a scenario as unlikely as the Condorcet supporters do.

> To get a reasonable result from Approval voting the voter needs to have at 
> least a working knowledge of how to vote strategically in an Approval election. 
> This is my major objection to Approval. 

Well perhaps parties could have "how to vote" cards.  That's how IRV strategy
works, isn't it?


Kevin Venzke
stepjak at yahoo.fr


___________________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!? -- Une adresse @yahoo.fr gratuite et en français !
Yahoo! Mail : http://fr.mail.yahoo.com