[EM] IRV vs. plurality
Kevin Venzke
stepjak at yahoo.fr
Wed Aug 6 10:55:50 PDT 2003
Eric,
Sorry, my message wasn't as clear as it could've been.
--- Eric Gorr <eric at ericgorr.net> a écrit :
> >>> 40 A
> >>> 35 C > B
> >>> 30 B
> >
> >> The example given by Eric is not that realistic ( it is not likely you would
> >> see such a vote set in a real election)
> >
> >If indeed this example is not realistic, it's because C decided
> >not to run lest he spoil the election and throw it to A.
>
> Is it really not realistic?
>
> It seems to me that it can easily be generated in
> genuine elections when there are three or more
> parties capable of getting first place votes.
Yes. What I was aiming at was: if IRV were in place, then the C voters would
have incentive to betray favorite; anticipating this, candidates like C would see
less value in running at all.
>
> >This incentive (for C to not run, and B voters to not vote for C) is the first
> >reason why I find IRV unacceptable.
>
> There is also an incentive for the C voters to
> vote insincerely and rank B first since they may
> know their candidate cannot win.
Excuse me, that is what I was trying to refer to. Actually if B-first voters like
C somewhat, they could of course rank C second.
>
> > > and in the normal course of discussion I would probably counter
> >> it with my favourite 49 A>B>C, 3 B>A>C, 48 C>B>A example with
> >> some comment about the importance of first preference
> >> votes/utility,
> >
> >But evidently you find such a scenario as unlikely as the
> >Condorcet supporters do.
>
> But, I really don't understand this scenario, assuming voters voted sincerely.
>
> It is clear that the unambiguous winner is B.
> This is very different from the example above,
> where B should be the winner, but A won the
> election.
I hear you. I suppose the response is, "Utility is important, and the first rank
is the only one that threatens to tell us anything about utility." Myself, I don't
see IRV as the solution to this concern, particularly if there's favorite-betrayal
incentive!
Kevin Venzke
stepjak at yahoo.fr
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