re: [EM] 3-level approval
Alex Small
asmall at physics.ucsb.edu
Sun Apr 28 15:24:47 PDT 2002
It has been pointed out that Demorep proposed something similar some time
ago. Demorep's proposal, of both yes/no ratings for each candidate as well
as ordinal rankings, is likely superior on theoretical and strategic
grounds. However, I see 3 disadvantages of his method relative to 3-level
approval:
1) Ordinal rankings are more costly to implement
2) The 3-phase process of look for a yes majority, do head-to-head math if
needed, and resolve cyclic ambiguity if needed, is more complicated to
explain.
3) As anybody on this list can attest, the resolution of cyclic
ambiguities can generate considerable debate. Although one method may have
decisive virtues over another, the debate gets quite involved.
I mean no disrespect to the method, I just think that, at least for now, 2-
level and 3-level approval are better to propose from a policy standpoint.
Public discussion of the aforementioned approval variants, as well as IRV
(which is now on the table for public consideration), may generate public
desire to learn of other methods, at which point Condorcet variants like
Demorep's can be proposed.
I think 3-level approval (my new favorite method) may be a suitable
counterproposal for those who have heard of IRV and like the greater level
of expressivity inherent in number voting, multi-level systems, etc. It
could be generalized to n-level approval, although adding more levels would
probably face the problem of diminishing returns.
Alex
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