[EM] Antisocial behavior

[Markus Schulze]

Dear Steve,

you wrote (17 May 2000):
> It seems pretty clear to me that in numerous recent messages, 
> Markus Schulze has been desperately trying to dodge the issue 
> (whether his claim that his voting method is better than Tideman 
> is reasonable or not) by making quite a few false claims and 
> unwarranted attacks on my character.
>
> After Markus' February 28 message ("Re: Tideman and GMC"), I 
> received some private email from EM subscribers commenting on 
> the nasty tone of that message.  A few weeks ago Mike Ossipoff 
> felt moved to publicly scold Markus for continuing to do more of 
> the same.  Markus' recent messages appear to me to be more of 
> the same.
>
> I have confidence in the ability of EM subscribers to recognize 
> the antisocial quality of his tactics.  However, in case I've 
> misunderstood what Markus has been saying, or in case I've made 
> errors in my arguments, I hope some subscribers (other than 
> Markus, of course) will take the time let me know.

My 28 Feb 2000 mail was a reply to your 23 Feb 2000 mail and
your 26 Feb 2000 mail in which you wrote complete nonsense
about the different methods.

For example, you wrote (23 Feb 2000):
> The so-called "Tideman bad example" (which Mike Ossipoff had
> posted) showed Tideman defeating an alternative which lost only
> one pairing, and that pairing was 1 to 0, and that outcome
> looked dubious.  Schulze would have elected that alternative.
> But Tideman elected the alternative which won that 1 to 0 
> pairing.  How can we claim that the Schulze winner (Tideman 
> loser) is preferable when not even one voter considers it 
> preferable?

Even until today, you couldn't present an example where the
Schulze method elects a candidate even though no voter prefers
this candidate to the Tideman winner which beats this candidate
pairwise. You posted an example on 13 May 2000. But this example
was impossible.

By the way, it is clear that your claim is complete nonsense.
If there is no voter who strictly prefers candidate A to
candidate B and at leat one voter who strictly prefers
candidate B to candidate A, then candidate A cannot defeat
candidate B via beat paths. Therefore candidate A is
eliminated either in a decisive step of the Schulze method
or in a random step of the Schulze method where a voter
is chosen randomly.

Markus Schulze
schulze at sol.physik.tu-berlin.de
schulze at math.tu-berlin.de
markusschulze at planet-interkom.de