[EM] A new Smith-efficient, monotone and cloneproof method (significantly different than Schulze/Ranked Pairs)

[Ted Stern]

In addition, I believe the method fails Burial, Chicken Dilemma
(defection), and forced cycle.

On Mon, Mar 17, 2025, 04:19 Joshua Boehme <joshua.p.boehme at gmail.com> wrote:

>
>
> On 3/11/25 5:49 AM, Grzegorz Pierczyński wrote:
>
> > I've just invented a new voting rule. It seems to me that it has very
> good
> > axiomatic properties (it satisfies e.g., Smith, ISDA, cloneproofness,
> > monotonicity, reversal symmetry) but I haven't found anything similar in
> > the voting literature. I'm curious about your thoughts.
>
> Interesting.
>
> However, if I'm understanding the algorithm correctly, it's not monotonic.
>
> In the step-throughs below, an uppercase pair XY means that X qualifies
> based on that pairwise matchup; a lowercase pair xy means that at least
> one
> of X and Y was already qualified at that step so nothing happens.
>
>
> First election:
> 0 ABCD
> 2 ADBC
> 3 ADCB
> 2 BACD
> 7 BADC
> 5 CADB
> 8 DCBA
>
> Margin of row over column:
>      A  B  C   D
> A   0 -7  1  11
> B   7  0 -5  -9
> C  -1  5  0 -13
> D -11  9 13   0
>
> Algorithm step-through:
> D B A (DC ad db BA cb AC)
> A D (AD DB)
> A (AD)
>
>
> Second election (same as before except the BACD voters switch to ABCD):
> 2 ABCD
> 2 ADBC
> 3 ADCB
> 0 BACD
> 7 BADC
> 5 CADB
> 8 DCBA
>
> Margin of row over column:
>      A  B  C   D
> A   0 -3  1  11
> B   3  0 -5  -9
> C  -1  5  0 -13
> D -11  9 13   0
>
> Algorithm step-through:
> D C B (DC ad db CB BA)
> D C (DC db CB)
> D (DC)
>
>
>
> A goes from the winner to the first candidate eliminated!
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
> info
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20250319/5f18ab57/attachment.htm>