[EM] Two round Condorcet / Improved TRS

[Chris Benham]

I am a bit rusty with these thought experiments, but I think I mean the 
former. That is, something other than Hare that meets Clone-Winner and 
both LNHarm and LNHelp is a tall order.

I suppose one could try to interpret Approval as  FPP(ER-Whole) and try 
to claim that it meets Later-no-Harm just like plain FPP, but I find 
that obviously perverse
and wrong.

I'm not very concerned about Hare's  (aka IRV's) alleged "strategic 
nomination problems".

Chris B.


On 12/10/2024 8:24 pm, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
> On 2024-10-12 03:24, Chris Benham wrote:
>>> "While even the paradigm of IRV retains this "few first preferences 
>>> - not legitimate" view, ..."
>>
>> No. it works the way it does because there isn't any other way of 
>> fixing FPP's  failure of Clone-Winner while keeping compliance with 
>> Later-no-Help and Later-no-Harm.
>
> Do you mean that it's the only method that can have those three 
> properties, or that it's the only FPP-based method?
>
> If the latter, it would be interesting to know (in a theory sense) if 
> there exists a method that passes all three and has fewer strategic 
> nomination problems than IRV.
>
> -km